THE AMERICAN INVESTOR AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 61-B OF THE NEW YORK GENERAL CORPORATION LAW by ZLINKOFF, SERGEI S.
THE AMERICAN INVESTOR AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SECTION 61-B OF THE NEW YORK
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
S:RGEI S. ZLINKOFFj-
"The divorce between corporate ownership and corporate con-
trol, now almost complete in many large business units, requires
that courts of equity be alert to protect the interests of scattered
ownership against personal profit-seeking on the'part of those
exercising centralized control and that minority owners be en-
couraged to be active in asserting their rights, as the only alterna-
tive of some administrative control by government of the internal
affairs of large corporations."
PROFESSOR SIDNEY P. SIMPSON. 1
"It is clear that the stockholder's derivative suit is an absolutely
necessary arm of equity jurisdiction and that, when used with jus-
tice and restraint, it has both public and private value."
RALPH M. CARSON, ESQ.2
"It must be remembered that [the stockholder's derivative suit]
is, at present, the only civil remedy that stockholders have for
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of those entrusted with the
management and direction of their corporations."
JUDGE BERNARD L. SmHENTAG.'
These considered judgments of distinguished scholar, counsel and
jurist, respectively, serve to emphasize the importance of the stock-
holder's derivative suit as the means evolved in the Anglo-American
legal system to provide legal protection for the interests of all who in-
vest in corporate shares. 4 Similarly, the increasingly dominant position
that publicly held stock corporations have come to occupy in every
phase'of modem economic life' underscores the "public and private
f Member of the New York Bar.
1, Simpson, Fifty Years ofAmerican Equity (1936) 50 HARV. L. RE v. 171, 191.
2. Carson, Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors (1942) 40 Micn. L.
REv. 1125, 1127.
3. Bayerv. Beran, 49N.Y.S. (2d) 2,4 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
4. The form of action is a little over a century old, stemming from Hichens v. Con.
greve, 4 Russ. 562, 38 Eng. Rep. R. 917 (Ch. 1828); the next case appears to be Foss v. Har-
bottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. R. 189 (Ch. 1843).
5. In 1909 the 200 largest non-financial corporations held 33M% of the assets of all
non-financial corporations. By 1933 the physical assets of these "200" corporations com-
prised one-half of the total industrial wealth of this country and represented one-fifth of the
entire wealth. NAT. RESOURCES Cou., THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1939)
pt. I, pp. 106-7.
The classic study of the "200" corporations is BEJZLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN COI-
PORATiON AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). The dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurred
in by Mr., now Chief, Justice Stone, in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 541 (1933), contains an
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value" of the stockholder's derivative suit. Obviously, therefore, legis-
lation or decisions which affect the conditions under which this protec-
tive device may be utilized are matters of great significance not only to
corporate managements and their cestuis que trustent, the stockholders
of whose funds and assets they are fiduciary guardians, but to the com-
munity at large. The law of New York is of particular importance be-
cause of the position of that state as a financial and commercial center
from which the affairs of innumerable corporations are directed and be-
cause the maintenance of derivative suits requires jurisdiction over the
corporations on whose behalf the suits are brought as well as over the
individual defendants.'
It is for these reasons that a New York statute, Section 61-b of the
General Corporation Law, enacted early in 1944 under the innocuous
title of "Security for Expenses"7 but also providing in a circuitous
important collection of material on this subject. See also TwEN rT[ET CE:TURY FUnD, BiG
BussNmss, Irs GRowTm AND ITS PLAcE (1937).
6. For a discussion of these jurisdictional problems and the propoals of the New Yor:
Law Revision Commission with respect to them, see Note (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 548.
7. N. Y. Laws 1944, c. 66S. effective April 9, 1944, adding a new subdivision to Sc-
tion 61 of the New York General Corporation Law. The statute reads:
"Sec. 61-b. Security for expenses. In any action instituted or maintained in
the right of any foreign or domestic corporation by the holder or holders of 1ez3
than five per centum of the outstanding shares of any class of such corporation's
stock or voting trust certificates, unless the shares or voting trust certificates held
by such holder or holders have a market value in excess of fifty thousand dollars,
the corporation in whose right such action is brought shall be entitled at any stage
of the proceedings before final judgment to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give
security for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which may be in-
curred by it in connection with such action and by the other parties defendant in
connection therewith for which it may become subject pursuant to section sixty-
one-a of this chapter, to which the corporation shall have recourze in such amount
as the court having jurisdiction shall determine upon the termination of such ac-
tion. The amount of such security may thereafter from time to time be increased
or decreased in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such action upon
showing that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive."
A companion statute passed at the same time changed the New Yorl: common law rule
of Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N. Y. 11, 94 N. E. 1038 (1911), that a stockholder need not have
owned his shares at the time the wrong complained of occurred, and imposed such a require-
ment. N.Y. Laws 1944, c. 667, adding the following paragraph to Section 61 of the General
Corporation Law:
"In any action brought by a shareholder in the right of a foreign or domestic
corporation it must be made to appear that the plaintiff was a stockholder at the
time of the transaction of which he complains or that his stock thereafter devolved
upon him by operation of law."
Although this statute is of obvious importance in relation to the matter. d s:-ed
herein, limitations of space prevent discussion of the constitutional questions presented by it.
Several lower New York courts have, however, already sustained the constitutionality of
this statute and have even applied it retroactively. Coane v. American Distilling Co., 182
Mlisc. 926,49 N. Y. S. (2d) 838 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Klum v. Clinton Trust Co., 183 Mic. 340,
48 N. Y. S. (2d) 267 (Sup. Ct. 1944). Contra: Noel Associates, Inc. v. Merrill, 53 N.Y. S.
(2d) 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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fashion for the imposition of unprecedented liabilities, merits careful
consideration on the part of the general public and especially the aver-
age, usually small, stockholding American investor." Several years
before, without the benefit of any hearings or study by the New York
Legislature, by the Law Revision Commission, or by any other public
body, a related statute, Section 61-a of the General Corporation Law,
had been enacted.9 It imposed upon corporations on whose behalf
derivative suits are brought a liability for the defendants' "reasonable
expenses, including attorneys fees" in the event that the defendants
are successful in whole or in part. No corresponding liability, however,
was imposed on the defendants for the reasonable counsel fees of the
corporation or its plaintiff-protectors in the event that the latter
achieve a measure of success in their prosecution of claims on behalf of
all the stockholders.
Although writers of all shades of opinion have leveled severe criticism
8. See infra, pp.367-70.
9. N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 350, effective April 14, 1941, adding a new subdivision "a" to
Section 61 of the General Corporation Law:
"In any action,-suit or proceeding against one or more officers or directors, or
former officers or directors, of a corporation, domestic or foreign, brought by the
corporation, or brought in its behalf by a receiver or trustee or by one or more
stockholders or creditors or officers or directors of such corporation, and whether
brought under the provisions of this article or otherwise, the reasonable expenses,
including attorneys fees, of any party plaintiff or party defendant incurred in con-
nection with the successful prosecution or defense of such action, suit or proceeding
shall be assessed upon the corporation; or, if any such party or parties shall be
successful in part only, or if such action, suit or proceeding shall be settled with the
approval of the court having jurisdiction thereof, the reasonable expenses, includ-
ing attorneys fees, of any or all such parties shall be assessed upon the corporation
in such amount as such court shall determine and find to be reasonable in the cir-
cumstances; and the amount of all such expenses so assessed shall be awarded as
special costs of the action, suit or proceeding and recoverable in the same manner
as statutory taxhble costs."
The provisions in the above statute with respect to the award of attorneys' fees out of
the fund recovered to the successful plaintiff are, of course, merely declarative of the com-
mon-law rule. See Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc. 222, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
By way of contrast, the provisions which give directors the right to recover their attorneys'
fees from the corporation in the event of complete or partial success award to them a right
and impose on the corporation a liability, neither of which existed at common law. Bailey
v. Bush Terminal Co., 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 877 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 899, 48
N. Y. S. (2d) 324 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd, 293 N. Y. 734, 56 N. E. (2d) 739 (1944).
An accompanying statute, N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 209, effective April 2, 1941, added a new
subdivision "a" to Section 27 of the General Corporation Law providing that a corporation
could by its certification of incorporation, by-laws, or specific resolution, allow indemnity to
a director "against expenses actually and necessarily incurred by him in connection with the
defense of any action, suit or proceeding in which he is made a party by reason of his being
or having been a director of the corporation, except in relation to matters as to which he
shall be adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negligence or miscon-
duct.".
[Vol. 54: 352
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION (i-B
at Section 61-a on grounds both of its poor draftsmanship", and of
public policy,' and though its constitutionality has not been author-
itatively passed upon,' 2 no legislative steps have been taken to meet
these criticisms. To the contrary, the New York Legislature has
enacted Section 61-b to impose the same liabilities upon the plaintiff-
stockholder if he happens to own either less than 5c of any outstand-
ing class of stock or voting certificate or stockholdings with a market
value of less than $50,000. The mechanics of the statute are as follows:
first, it requires the small stockholder to furnish, whenever the nominal
defendant corporation so requests of the court, sufficient security to
cover any liability for the defendants' reasonable expenses, including
attorneys' fees, that might be assessed against the corporation under
the provisions of Section 61-a; secondly, the court upon the termina-
tion of the action may resort to the security required to be posted by
the small stockholder to pay the defendants' expenses, including reason-
able attorneys' fees. The obvious effect of these provisions is succinctly
summarized by these words of one New York judge: "It would be
denying the obvious to deny that the dire effect of the statute-if not
the deliberate purpose of it-is to bar many stockholders' actions by
making them excessively costly and difficult." 13
The extreme importance of Section 61-b to all American investors is
emphasized by two of its additional aspects. First, it is not limited in
its application to suits involving New York corporations, but by its
express terms 4 affects the rights of the small stockholders of foreign
corporations in the event that they should seek to invoke the protection
of the derivative suit in New York State. Indeed, all the cases to date
10. WAsHINGTON, CORPOPALTE ExEcutvEs' CosxPES.%Tio (1942) c. 20, esp- cially
pp. 423-7; Ballantine, California's 1943 Statute as to Directors' Litigation Expenses (1943)
31 CALIF. L. R-Ev. 515,521-6: Note (1942) 30 C.A i. L. REv. 667,674-6.
Legislation designed to cure the poor draftsmanship of Sections 61-a and 27-a has been
recommended by the Law Revision Commission after a comprehensive study of the sub-
ject. See RECOMMENDATION OF THE L.w REVIsION Co,,ussloN RELATING TO R Ur nu E-
mENT OF LIT ATioN EXPENSES OF CORPORTEr OFFICmILS, submitted in conjunction with
S. I. 122 and A. I. 183, Jan. 13, 1945. The complete study of the Law Reision Commis-
sion, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65E, has znot yet been printed. In its recommendations, however,
the Commission states that it did not seek to deal with questions of policy, but that the
proposed legislation was merely "designed to make the two statutes consistent so far as
possible."
11. Hornstein, Directors' Expenses in Stockholders' Suits (1943) 43 COL. L. REv. 301.
12. The Court of Appeals in Matter of Bailey, 291 N.Y. 534, 0 N. E. (2d) 653 (1943),
e-pressly left open the question of the constitutionality of Section 61-a, although it had
been sustained by the lower court, Matter of Bailey, 178 Misc. 1045, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 275
(Sup. Ct. 1942). Hayman v. Morris, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 834 (Sup. Ct. 1942), broadly sustained
the constitutionality of the statute.
13. Collins, J., in Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 49 N.Y. S. (2d) 64,73 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
14. Thus, the opening sentence of the statute commences: "In any action instituted or
maintained in the right of any foreign or domestic corporation .... " N. Y. Gm.-. CorP.
LAW § 61-b. For the entire text of the statute see note 7 svpra.
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wherein the statute has been invoked have involved foreign corpora-
tions and the rights of their small stockholders.'1 Secondly, in all likeli-
hood the statute will be deemed applicable not only to state court ac-
tions but, under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins," to those derivative suits
brought in the federal courts located in New York in which federal
jurisdiction is predicated upon diversity of citizenship.' Its sponsor,
the New York Chamber of Commerce, 'I specifically intended it to apply
to federal court actions on the ground that it affected "substantive
rights," '9 and that it does can hardly be denied. Particularly is this
true in view of the realistic interpretation which the Supreme Court
of the United States has given the words "substantive rights" in its
rigorous application of the Erie doctrine.2" Indeed, even a decade
before the Erie decision, the Supreme Court recognized that a state
statute imposing liability for reasonable attorneys' fees ivas not a
matter affecting merely procedure, although the liability was denomi-
nated in the statute as "costs," but one dealing with substance and
therefore applicable to a federal court suit.2 1
15. See cases cited infra note 23.
16. 304 U. S. 64 (1938). For two valuable discussions on the background and signifi-
cance of this far-reaching decision see McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of "General"
Law in the Federal Courts (1938) 33 ILL. L. REV. 126; Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336.
17. For treatment of the extent to which the Erie doctrine is applicable when diversity
is not the sole basis of federal jurisdiction see Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the
Law of Trademarks and Unfair Competition (1942) 42 CoL. L. REv. 955, 969-74, 986, 990;
Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition: Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-Tritst, Trademark
and Unfair Competition Suits (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 514, 542-6. See also discussion of recent
Supreme Court cases in Note (1943) 43 CoL. L. REv. 837, 861-7.
It is the author's view that the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins is applicable only where the
basis of federal jurisdiction is mere diversity of citizenship and that it has no application to
actions where the federal court's jurisdiction is predicated upon other grounds. If this view
is correct, Section 61-b would not be applicable to cases like Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.
(2d) 422 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), cert. denied, 65 S. Ct. 36 (U. S. 1944) (double derivative stock-
holder's suit based upon violation of Public Utility Holding Company Act).
18. Seeinfra, pp. 359-60.
19. WooD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS (Spe-
cial Committee on Corporate Litigation of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New
York, 1944) (hereinafter cited as REPORT) 18.
20. For discussion of the cases involving the distinctionbetween "substance" and "pro.
cedure" under the Erie case, see Notes (1941) 41 COL. L. REV. 104, (1943) 43 COL. L. REV.
836,856,867, 906-7.
21. In Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U. S. 238, 243-4 (1928), involving a
Nebraska statute imposing liability on insurance companies for reasonable attorneys' fees
in the event of a successful suit on a policy by the beneficiary thereof, Mr., now Chief, Justice
Stone declared that "whether this liability for an attorney's fee . . . may be enforced in
the federal courts does not depend on any nice distinctions which may be taken between the
right created and the remedy given. Disregarding mere matters of form, it is the policy of the
state to allow plaintiffs to recover an attorney's fee in certain cases, and it has made that policy
effective by making the allowance of the fee mandatory on its courts in those cases. It would be
at least anomalous if this policy could be thwarted and the right so plainly given destroyed by
removal of the case to the federal courts.
[Vol. 54 :352
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Obviously, therefore, Section 61-b because of its nature and broad
application raises fundamental social, economic and political ques-
tions. 22 Surprisingly enough, however, there has been little discussion
of the vital issues of constitutional law involved although a number of
lower New York courts have already ruled upon its constitutionality2 3
and one of these cases is now pending for decision before the New York
Court of Appeals. 24 Whether or not the Court of Appeals chooses to
pass upon the constitutional questions in that particular action, it
seems far more than probable that owing to the importance of the
statute, the issue of constitutionality will be presented repeatedly to
"That the statute directs the allowance, which is made to plaintiff, to be added to the
judgment as costs are added does not make it costs in the ordinary sense of the traditional,
arbitrary and small fees of court officers, attorneys' docket fees and the like, allowed to
counsel by R. S. §§ 823,824.
"The present allowance, since it is not costs in the ordinary sense, is not within the field
of costs legislation covered by R. S. §§ 823, 824." (Emphasis supplied.) See also Sacramento
Municipal Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elect. Co., 20 Cal. (2d) 684, 128 P. (2d) 529 (1942),
cert. denied, 318 U. S. 759, discussed infra, note 126.
22. See Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Deriratirc Suits in Rew Ferh
(1944) 32 CALIF. L. REv. 123; Jackson, Reorganization of the Corporate Concept (194) 5
Co"n. REORG. 323.
23. Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 188 (App. Div., 1st Dep't. 1944), affirmed
3-2 the decision of Judge Collins, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944), sustaining the con-
stitutionality of the statute. Although the majority wrote no opinion, two judges disznted
on the ground that since the statute as a matter of construction and constitutional law was
not retroactive, it did not apply to pending actions like the Shielcrawl case, and therefore
there was no need to decide the constitutionality per se of Section 61-b. Wolf v. Athinson,
182 Misc. 675, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 703 (Sup. Ct. 1944); 'Mann v. Luke, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 10,
1944, p. 1244, col. 4 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.), sustained the constitutionality of the statute on the
authority of Shielcrawt v. Moffett, supra. Contra: Citron v. Mangel Stores Corp., 50 N. Y.
S. (2d) 416 (Sup. Ct. 1944), holding the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. This decision has an interesting background. At the time the corporation
made its motion for security under Section 61-b, the defendant-directors and officers moved
to dismiss the complaint; the latter motion was granted by Judge Schreiher on the grounds
(a) that the complaint failed to show damage to the corporation as a result of the com-
plained-of acts, and (b) that the complaint related to matters concerning the internal
management of a foreign corporation which was deemed to be a subject over which the New
York courts would not take jurisdiction. Citron v. Mangel Stores Corp., N. Y. L. J., Aug. 8,
1944, p. 245, col. 2 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.). Subsequently, Judge Koch handed down his decision in
the Citron case, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 416 (Sup. Ct. 1944), denying the corporation's motion for
security because of Section 61-b's unconstitutionality. In view of the prior decision dis-
missing the complaint, no order was entered upon Judge Koch's decision, and it has become a
moot question in the case because, after its rendition, the Appellate Division sustained with-
out opinion the dismissal of the complaint, 268 App. Div. 905, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 754 (1st
Dep't, 1944), and later denied leave to appeal the question to the Court of Appeals. 52
N. Y. S. (2d) 579 (App. Div., 1st Dep't, 1944). Finally, that court declined to grant leave to
bring the dismissal of the complaint before it. N.Y. L. J., Jan. 13,1945, p. 168, col. 3 (N. Y.
Ct.App.).
24. Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944), ai'd re., 51 N. Y. S.
(2d) 188 (App. Div., 1st Dep't, 1944).
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the New York courts, or to the federal courts sitting in New York, until
there is a conclusive decision by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
This article is devoted to a consideration of the fundamental ques-
tions of constitutional law raised by Section 61-b. The resolution of
constitutional law problems, however, does not turn upon a mere
iechanistic matching of the language of the enactment in question
with that of the constitutional provisions invoked,25 but, as the late
Mr. Justice Brandeis repeatedly emphasized:
"The determination of these questions involves aii enquiry into
facts. Unless we know the facts on which the legislators may have
acted, we cannot properly decide whether they were (or whether
their measures are) unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Knowl-
edge is essential to understanding; and understanding should
precede judging." 2
In keeping with these premises, the Supreme Court has reiterated the
undesirability of deciding the constitutionality of statutes in vacuo
without having before it, either by way of judicial notice or factual
findings, "adequate findings of fact in relation to controlling economic
conditions." 27 Indeed, the Court, when it has felt it could not take
judicial notice of the social and economic conditions involved, has
reversed lower court decisions ruling upon the constitutionality of
statutes because of an absence of social and economic data with which
the statutes in question were interrelated, and has directed the lower
courts to make their constitutional rulings only after they have made
such factual findings. 2
25. Chief Justice Marshall is the father of the theory that constitutional questions
should be'decided by a comparison of the words of the statute with the specific constitutional
provision involved. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177-9 (U. S. 1803). The
Supreme Court, however, has long since departed from such a mechanistic method of decid-
ing these issues. For discussion of recent trends in the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and the approach of that tribunal see Pekelis, The Case for a Juriprudence of Welfare
(1944) 11 SocIAL RESEARCH 312.
26. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 517,
519-20 (1924).
27. Chief Justice Hughes in Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194,
211 (1934). Similarly, the concurring opinion of Justices Stone and Cardozo reflects what
is undoubtedly the Court's position today on the importance of the relevant social and eco-
nomic facts in the resolution of constitutional law questions: "We are in accord with the
view that it is inexpedient to determine grave constitutional questions upon a demurrer to a
complaint, or upon an equivalent motion, if there is a reasonable likelihood that the produc.
tion of evidence will make the answer to the question clearer." Id. at 213.
28. See, e.g., Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194 (1934). Subse-
quently, after the lower court had made appropriate factual findings, the Supreme Court
affirmed its decision. Bbrden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U, S. 251 (1936); see
also Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U. S. 5, 10 (1938). In Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 77 (1939),
[Vol. 54: 352
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It is therefore essential to a consideration of the constitutional law
problems raised by Section 61-b to consider the economic and social
patterns of which it must be viewed as an integral part, including "the
genesis of the statute, the evils it seeks to rectify, the conditions which
inspired it, and its effect." 29 Such an analysis is especially requisite
because it is the presumption of factual support for the legislation
involved that underlies the often-invoked doctrine of presumptive
constitutionality30 upon which the leading case, Shielcrawt v. Moffet, 31
sustaining Section 61-b's constitutionality, has so heavily relied.
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF SECTIoN 61-B. 32
Origin and Legislative History of Section 6x-b. Section 61-b did not
originate with the Law Revision Commission or the Judicial Council
of the State of New York, and, indeed, their opinion was not even re-
quested. Nor was the statute one proposed by any bar association.
Admittedly it is identical, except in one respect,13 with one recom-
the Court affirmed the granting of a temporary injunction and the denial of the dismis-al of
an action challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, saying: "The manner in and
extent to which the challenged statute offends or complies with the applicable provis-ions of
the Constitution will be dearer after final hearing and findings."
The importance which the Supreme Court attaches to adequate presentation of relevant
facts may be seen in the case of Eastern Central Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 321
U. S. 194 (1944), in which a majority of the Court reversed an order of the ICC upon the
ground that the record did not adequately present factual considerations which the majority
thought relevant to the administrative determination. "We do not mean by this to imply
that the result the Commission has reached would not be sustained if a sufficient basis were
supplied in the record. We do not undertake to determine what result the CommiLsson
should reach. But we cannot say the one at which it has arrived has the sanction of law
without further basis than we now have." Id. at 210.
29. Collins, J., in Shielcrawtv. Moffett, 49 N.Y. S. (2d) 64,71 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
30. That the doctrine of the presumption of the legislation is one that rests upon
rebuttable factual assumptions is illustrated by the classic statement of the doctrine con-
tained in the well known opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in the case of Borden's Farm
Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 209 (1934): "Respondents invoke the presumption
which attaches to the legislative action. But that is a presumption of fact, of the existence
of factual conditions supporting the legislation. As such, it is a rebuttable presumption
[citing cases]. It is not a conclusive presumption, or a rule of law which makes legislative
action invulnerable to constitutional assault. . . ." See also two excellent Notes reviewing
and analyzing the Supreme Court decisions on the subject of the presumption of constitu-
tionality contained in (1936) 36 COL. L. Rnzv. 283 and (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 1136.
31. 49 N.Y. S. (2d) 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944), cited supra note 23.
32. In the following factual analysis the author has used much of the factual material
presented in Hornstein, supra note 22, upon the legislative history of Section 61-b and the
Report of the New York Chamber of Commerce, combining with it other authenticated
evidence.
33. The bill introduced and enacted by the legislature differed from that recommended
by the Chamber only in that it imposed the requirement of security and possible ultimate
liability upon plaintiffs holding shares having a market value of less than 650,000, or 5%
of the shares, whereas the Chamber recommended that they be imposed if the market value
of the plaintiff's shares was less than $100,000, or 5%.
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mended by the New York Chamber of Commerce,3 4 and it was intro-
duced in the state legislature simultaneously with the public release of
the Chamber's proposed act and Report of its Special Committee on
Corporate Litigation 35 dealing with stockholder suits 30 and issued
after a privately conducted, study of more than a year.
No hearings of any character were conducted by the legislature, and
it was hurriedly passed in the closing days of the legislative session
with the scantiest of debate. Every bar group that had an opportunity
to express an opinion about the Act before its signature by the Gov-
ernor, including the Committee on State Legislation of the New York
County Lawyers Association, the Federal Bar Association of New
York, New Jersey and Connecticut, and the Law Reform Committee
of the New York City Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, con-
demned the statute as undesirable." Strong objection to the legislation
was made by the non-partisan Citizens Union of New York City and
by the American Investors Union, a non-profit organization devoted
to the protection of the interests of the American investor, and both
the AFL and CIO issued statements expressing disapproval. Many of
these groups joined numerous individuals in requesting the legislature
and the governor of New York to hold hearings before enacting the
measure into law, but none was held. 11
Thus Section 61-b was enacted without the legislative or guberna-
torial investigation into the facts that has so often led the Supreme
Court of the United States to sustain statutes as a presumptively
reasonable exercise of legislative power. 39
34. "The New York State Chamber of Commerce . . .is not in fact a state chamber
at all and is indeed entirely different from most chambers of commerce. It is strictly a New
York organization composed very largely of extremely conservative corporation and finan-
cial interests of that City." Communication from the Springfield, Illinois, Chamber of
Commerce to the editor of FORBES MAGAZINE and printed in its issue of May 15, 1944, at 10;
quoted by Jackson, supra note 22, at 337, n. 76.
35. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 19.
36. "The chief document in the winter drive for the new law was a detailed study of
stockholders' derivative actions by the New York State Chamber of Commerce....
Political strings apparently had been pulled in Albany, for the publication of the Report
was followed almost immediately by the introduction of a bill, and it became law before
important opposition could develop." Crane, N. Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1944, § 5, p. 5, col. 8,
37. Hornstein, supra note 22, at 123-4.
38. PM, March 12, 1944, p. 12, col. 1; PM, April 4,1944, p. 11, col. 1; N. Y. Evening
Post, April 12, 1944, p. 29, col. 1; YOUR INVESTMENTS (Am. Investors Union) April 1944,
pp. 29-30,32-3.
39. See, e.g., Nebbiav. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 515 (1934), where Mr. Justice Roberts,
in speaking for a majority of the Court, stated that "we first inquire as to the occasion for tile
legislation and its history." After a review in great detail of the factual conditions, he con-
tinued with a paunstak~ng analysis of the legislative history, pointing 'out the extensive
public hearings conducted by a joint legislative committee and the character of the evidence
there adduced. He then referred to the joint legislative committee's report based upon these
hearings, stating "that the conscientious efforts and thoroughness exhibited by the report
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Abuses of the Stockholder's Suit Assertedly Justifying Section 6z-b.
The Report of the New York Chamber of Commerce drew as its
fundamental conclusion that stockholders' derivative suits do not
justify their cost in time and money to the stockholders of corporations
or to the state. The following statistics on derivative actions brought
during the decade 1932-1942 in the Supreme Court of New York and
Kings Counties and in the Federal Court for the Southern District of
New York are the main evidence upon which the recommendations of
the Report of the Chamber of Commerce are predicated:
"Analysis of the 1400 minority stockholders' actions . .. , which
total with duplicating actions eliminated is reduced to 1266, shows
that of this number, 693 involved so-called privately or closely held
corporations and that 573 involved publicly held corporations. Out
of the 693 actions involving closely held corporations, recoveries
were had in 32 cases, or 5%, settlements were made in 194 cases, or
28%, 122 cases or 18% were dismissed, and the remainder were dis-
continued or show no record disposition. Out of the 573 actions in-
volving publicly held corporations, recoveries were had in 13 cases
or 2%, settlements were made in 33 cases with court approval, or
6%, and 215 cases or 37% were dismissed. Of the remainder, 60
cases or 10% were settled privately, 155 or 27% were discontinued
(15 of these known to have been discontinued with no paynent),
54 are pending and 43 show no record disposition." 40
Taking these very figures, as well as others presented in the Report,
it may be showna that on their own grounds they afford no justification
for the conclusions of the Report. First, since the Report discloses that
in New York County during the ten-year period involved there were
some 421,417 suits of all types filed, only 1,128, or .27%, were suits
brought by stockholders; in Kings County,41 out of 86,840 suits, only
142, or. 16%, were litigations of this character; and in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York only 130 suits of
this type were instituted, no figures being given for the total number of
actions filed.4 2 Certainly these figures fail to support any thesis that
minority stockholder suits have constituted an undue burden upon the
courts.
Secondly, "if we include in recoveries not only judgments after trial,
or on court-approved settlements, but also all other settlements, the
lend weight to the committee's conclusions." Id. at 516. Only after thus reviewing the
factual material which the legislature considered in passing the legislation did he conclude
that where the legislation has a "reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpoz-, the
requirements of the Constitution are satisfied." Id. at 537.
40. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 6.
41. This covers only 1938-1942, which are the only years for which figures are given in
the Report.
42. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 3-4.
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figures for recoveries in suits involving publicly held corporations
would go up to 31y per cent. This figure is reached by adding to the
8 per cent previously noted, a figure of 10 per cent for 'settlements'
without court approval, and half of the 27 per cent total of 'discon-
tinued' cases, [since] the Report, at 33, indicates that as many as 50 per
cent of the discontinuances may represent private settlements." 41
Thirdly, since only a small percentage of any type of litigation
reaches the stage of actual trial,44 and since it is not possible to tell
with complete accuracy whether or not "settlements" were made or
the exact reasons for discontinuances, it would seem more proper in
evaluating the results of derivative suits to consider the figures for the
number of suits in which issue was joined and thereafter either the
plaintiff or defendant was successful, eliminating all actions that were
discontinued. Applying this method of analysis to the Report's figures,
"we find 171 cases in which issues were joined. Out of this number
there were 13 recoveries and 93 settlements, while only 65 suits were
won by the defendants. In other words, 106 out of 171 suits were won
by stockholders, or 62 per cent of the cases involved." 4 Furthermore,
it is difficult to express any views about'the number of cases in which
the defendants secured dismissal of the actions because the Report
fails to give any clue as to the bases upon which the suits were adversely
terminated to the plaintiff, i.e., whether on the merits or on technical
grounds.
Nor do the figures of the assertedly low number of judgments and
settlements that were recovered by stockholders for their corporations
give an accurate basis of conclusion. Attention must be called to the
fact that almost all the judgments and settlements involved recoveries
of hundreds of thousands of dollars and, in many instances, of millions. 41
43. Hornstein, supra note 22, at 127-8.
44. The eminent former New York Supreme Court Judge Philip McCook has stated
that a study of all litigation instituted in the Supreme Court, New York County, disclosed
that of all such suits, including commercial and tort actions of all kinds, less than 5% ever
reached trial. Cited in Hornstein, supra note 22, at 127, n. 12.
45. YOUR INVESTMENTS (Am. Investors Union) March 1944, p. 2 7 .
46. Among these may be mentioned: Bysheim v. Miranda, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 15 (Sup,
Ct. 1943) (settlement resulting in estimated benefits of $1,800,000 upon trial of action insti-
tuted by new board of directors, approved by the Government, on charges originally made by
plaintiff-stockholders); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960 (S. D. N. Y.
1942) (settlement of $4,000,000 after judgment); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 653
(Sup. Ct. 1941), affid mem., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 131 (1st Dep't 1941) (settle-
ment of $1,809,935 after decision on merits by trial court); Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 57
N. E. (2d) 825 (1944) (reversing an Appellate Division decision, 265 App. Div. 455, 39
N. Y. S. (2d) 625 (2d Dep't 1943), which dismissed the complaint in an action in which the
Supreme Court had awarded a recovery of more than $350,000); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N. Y. S.
(2d) 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (settlement of $750,000 after decision on the merits by trial court);
Cwerdinski v. Bent, 256 App. Div. 612, 11 N.Y.S. (2d) 208 (1st Dep't 1939) (settlement of
$1,105,821 in repayment of corporate funds and by defendants in securing private settle-
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The Report seeks to minimize the importance of these recoveries by
emphasizing that the consequent increase in the value of each share of
stock in question was often no more than a few cents.4 7 This, however,
rather than indicating the baselessness of the actions involved, merely
reflects the large number of shares which most important corporations
have outstanding in the hands of the public.- Obviously, if there are
millions of shares outstanding, even a recovery of millions of dollars
will yield but a small increase in the value of each share; 4 but this
fact should not be permitted to obscure the large sums that have been
recovered on behalf of all the shareholders. The failure of the stock-
holder's suit to provide complaining stockholders with sufficient per-
sonal incentive to make use of it as a remedy is one of its great weak-
ments during period prior to institution of action, after court ruled main action barred by
statute of limitations); Gallin v. National City Bank, 155 Misc. 880, 231 N. Y. Supp. 795
(Sup. Ct. 1935) (judgment of $1,844,642.21 after special master had taken testimony). For a
more complete tabulation of settlements, see Hornstein, The Counscl Fee in Stek.o!der's
Derivative Suits (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 784, 814; Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in
Stockhtolder's Derivative Suits (1942) 42 CoL. L. REv. 574, 587 (bringing the earlier list up to
date). Among the more important of these recoveries in minority stockholders' derivative
actions outside of New York are Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109 F. (2d) 543 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940),
cert. denied, 311 U. S. 665 (1940) (judgment after trial of $736,485.57); Overfieldv. Pennroad
Corp. (proposed settlement of $15,000,000 after Third Circuit Court of Appeals by a 2-1
vote had reversed, solely on the grounds of the statute of limitations, a judgment, after
trial, of approimately $23,000,000), N. Y. Times, March 2, 1945, p. 25, col. 5; Mann v.
Hearst (unreported decision of Cal. Super. Ct., 1941) (judgment of $5,022,258.89).
This article represents solely the work, judgment and views of the author as an indi-
vidual. The firm of which the author is a member, has acted as counsel for the plaintiff in a
number of the above mentioned cdses. It has likewise acted to a lesser extent as counsel for
corporate and individual defendants in derivative suits.
Even the record of actions instituted does not afford an adequate picture of the extent
to which corporate fiduciaries have in fact failed to fulfil their responsibilities to their stocl-
holders. An SEC study, dealing only with investment trusts, reveals that of seven billion
dollars invested by the public between 1 and 1) billion dollars were lost within a period of
ten years "due to a management acting for its own interests either in bad faith or with wanton
disregard of the rights of investors." Testimony of L. M. C. Smith, Associate Counsel,
Hearings before a Subcommittce of the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3580, 76th
Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940) 788. See also id. at 796, 799, S03. The study was printed a- H. R.
Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
See also the earlier Congressional investigations, such as the Pecora Investigation
(1932-1934), Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 84, 72nd Cong.
Sess. (1932-1933) and Hearings on S. 56 and S. 97, 73rd Cong. (1933-1934); and the Wheeler
Investigation of Railroads, Holding Companies and Affiliated Companies, Hearings bLfore
the Committee on Interstate Conmnerce on S. R. 71, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
47. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 49-54.
48. GOLDSMITH AND PAPtuALEE, TNEC REP., DisTuBurion op Ow-Ensme n. THE 200
LARGEST No.NrINANcIAL CORPORATIONS, Monograph 29 (1940), show that these corporations
rarely have less than half a milliQn outstanding shares, and often many millions of such
shares. "Basic Statistical Data on Each of 403 Equity Security Issues in 200 Largest Non-
financial Corporations" is given in id. at 206.
49. Seeinfra, pp. 367-3.
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nesses, ° but it is anomalous that a weakness should be used as a
justification for practical abolition of this means of relief without sub-
stituting another more efficient in its place.
Not only does the Report fail to call proper attention to these aspects
of its cited figures, but it wholly misstates the nature of the actions
wherein judgments and settlements were obtained by saying that "in
none of them has bad faith or actual fraud on the part of the manage-
ment been found or suggested." 51 The complete falsity of this general
characterization of the actions involved has been indicated by Horn-
stein,52 and it would serve no purpose to rediscuss here the issues in
these litigations.
Apart from the substantial recoveries secured by small stockholders
for the benefit of their corporations, the availability of the minority
stockholder's suit has undoubtedly been in many instances a deterrent
to the abuse of fiduciary powers by officers and directors, who them-
selves often have no substantial financial interest in the corporations
under their administration."3 This specific point was recently made by
a federal judge with wide experience in corporate matters:
"The measure of effectiveness of the stockholder's derivative
suit cannot be taken by a computation of the money recovery in
the litigated cases. The minatory effect of such actions has un-
doubtedly prevented diversion of large amounts from stockholders
to managements and outsiders. Corporate attorneys now have an
arsenal of authorities to support their cautioning advice to clients
who may be disposed to risk evasion of the high standard the courts
have imposed upon directors." 54
Similar views were expressed by the Citizens Union of the City of New
York in disapproving Section 61-b: "In spite of abuses, minority stock-
holders' suits have been an effective means of holding large corporations
50. Jackson, supra note 22, at 340, suggests remedying this defect by giving to share.
holders instrumental in procuring a recovery for all stockholders some personal interest in
the amount obtained.
51. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 10.
52. Hornstein, supra note 22, at 129-31.
53. A TNEC study of the distribution of stockholders in the 200 largest non-financial
corporations of this*country reveals that "The financial stake of officers and directors in
their own corporation is relatively small. Officers and directors own 6% of the common
stock and slightly over 2% of the preferred stock of the 200 corporations. One-half of tho
individual officers and directors own securities having a market value (as of September 30,
1939) of less than $20,000 each." GOLDSMITH AND PARMALEE, op. cit. supra note 48, at xvi.
DIMocx, TNEC REP., BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE CORPORATIONS, Mono.
graph 11 (1940) 12, expresses the conclusion that "In each of these business groups and for
all of the corporations combined, it is thus apparent that in the typical large corporation
management holdings are comparatively insignificant when expressed in relative terms."
54. Rifkind, J., in Brendlev. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 526 (S. D. N.Y. 1942).
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in restraint and preventing them from wasting large sums of the stock-
holders' money for the benefit of a favorite few." 11
While there is a complete lack of any factual foundation for the
Report's wholesale charges of groundless "strike" suits, it is far more
significant that the statute proposed and enacted, Section 61-b, does
not provide an effective means for their elimination-the principal
justification urged for the enactment of the statute in both the Report
and the Governor's message accompanying his signing of the bill. The
provisions of the act dealing with the posting of security for the de-
fendants' expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, apply regard-
less of whether the small stockholder has a reasonable or even merito-
rious claim. The large stockholder is not only wholly exempt from the
requirement of posting security, but he is also exempt from liability
for these expenses, imposed upon the small stockholder indirectly
through the security device. Significantly, this exoneration from the
requirement of security, and consequently from ultimate liability as
well, is wholly unrelated to whether or not the large stockholder's
claim is in fact shown to be baseless, groundless or prosecuted in bad
faith. There is not the slightest evidence of any kind that the greater
the value or extent of a plaintiff's stockholdings, the more justified his
claim. As the court in Shielcrawt v. AMoffett,rs although sustaining the
constitutionality of Section 61-b, has candidly stated:
"It has been thought that the holder of a few shares of stock
might be more disastrously affected by waste and wrongdoing than
would be the owner of many shares. Too, the grievance of one small
stockholder may be as justifiable as the grievance of a hundred.
Yet this assailed statute presupposes that an action initiated by a
stockholder whose holdings have a market value in excess of
$50,000, or who represents at least 5% of the outstanding shares, is
more meritorious than an action brought by the holder of a few,
shares or shares of lesser value. The stockholder's access to the
courts is thus made dependent on the magnitude of his till." Nl
Apart from the general charge of the baselessness of derivative ac-
tions, three specific "evils" are commented upon in the Report. The
55. Quoted by Judge Collins in Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 64, 72 (Sup.
Ct. 1944). The New York County Lawyers Association, in expressing its criticism of Sec-
tion 61-b, stated: "New York State has long held leadership in matters financial and, con-
scious of their responsibilities, its courts long set a high standard in enforcement of fiduciary
responsibility. Any reduction in those standards may have unpredictable long-range effccts
not pleasant to contemplate. V regard this bill as tending to prevent enforcement of thee
standards, and accordingly contrary to the public interests. It is accordingly, and for all the
other reasons mentioned, disapproved." Quoted in Shielcrawt v. Moffett, Record on Appeal
before N. Y. Court of Appeals, fols. 479-SO.
56. Shielcrawtv. Moffett, 49 N.Y. S. (2d) 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
57. 1d. at 72.
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first is the duplication of actions once a suit of this character is in-
stituted. This abuse can58 and should be eliminated, but" Section 61-b
has nothing whatever to do with its cure. In fact, the Report makes no
recommendation of a method to deal with this problem. The second
"evil" is the allowance of "extravagant" fees to attorneys and counsel
for small stockholders. It is significant that although these charges
are made, the Report again makes no recommendation with respect
to the matter; certainly the statute does not obviate this alleged abuse.
Moreover, it would seem that there is no true foundation in fact for the
claim that excessive fees are awarded, since fees are predicated upon
the amount of recovery inuring to the benefit of all the stockholders as
the result of the attorney's efforts, as well as upon the amount of work
done and the difficulties encountered in prosecuting the claim. In each
instance it is the court which fixes the fair amount of the attorney's
compensation."9
The third "evil" mentioned is that of "private settlements to the
detriment of the stockholders and the corporations involved." It is
interesting to note the care with which the Report skims over this topic,
making no recommendation for elimination of this genuine evil. In-
deed, the Report itself points out that although the Law Revision
Commission of New York in 1942 proposed a statute which would
largely destroy the possibility of these private deals, "substantial
opposition developed against this on the part of corporations and
defendants' attorneys, and the legislature failed to pass the above sec-
tion, which was modeled after Section 23(c) of the Federal Rules of
Practice."60 Nor has Section 61-b the slightest relation to the obviation
of these "private settlements," which have often enabled faithless
fiduciaries to escape detection or accountability for illegal actions"
(by, for example, the lapse of the statute of limitations) except, of
course, in so far as it effectually eliminates all stockholder suits. Al-
though the Governor in signing the bill apparently acted under the
58. See, e.g., the recommendation of Hornstein, supra note 22, at 134.
59. For an analysis of the subject of counsel fees in derivative suits see Hornstein, The
Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits (1939) 39 COL. L. REV. 784.
60. REORT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 89-90.
61. For instances of these private settlements see Hornstein, supra note 22, at 136-7.
The notorious Hopson escaped detection for years by "buying off" stockholders' suits, and,
when he was finally exposed, the Statute of Limitations prevented civil actions against him.
See Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Hopson, 176 Misc. 220, 25 N. Y. S. (2d)
502 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 731, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 139 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd
sub nom. Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Associated Gas & Elect. Co., 288
N. Y. 668,43 N. E. (2d) 71 (1942).
The SEC has revealed in part the extent of the practice of private settlements being paid
for out of the corporate treasury and has vigorously denounced such settlements. See SEC,
REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, AcTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND
FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEEq (1937) pt. I, 694-7.
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misapprehension that it did outlaw such settlements,r2 Section 61-b
contains not a word that forbids or in any way deals with the specific
problem of "secret settlements." As the financial editor of the New
York Times has pointedly remarked: "The most significant criticism
came from persons friendly to the purposes of the bill. These declared
that the same end would be achieved without any doubt of constitu-
tionality if the bill merely required that all stockholders' derivative
suits be settled in court." r3
Operation and Effect of Section 6x-b. Does Section 61-b concern only
the "strike suit" plaintiff or will any substantial number of stockholders
in American corporations be affected by its terms? The simple answer
to this fundamental question appears to be that the act will unques-
tionably affect the rights of an overwhelming majority of stockholders
who seek to maintain derivative suits in New York.
A monographic study prepared for the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee by the SEC,6 reveals the following data on the dis-
tribution of shareholdings in 1710 corporations having securities listed
upon any national exchange, which were chosen for study because
"compared to all domestic corporations, these 1,710 companies-only
2 per cent of the total nunber-accounted for 2ore than half of the total
sharehwldings and somewhat over 40 per cent of the estimated value of all
outstanding stocks." 65 The stocks of these 1710 key corporations were
found to be held in fourteen million record shareholdings, and, analyz-
ing their distribution from the point of view of their value, the SEC
found that 7,500,000 of these shareholdings, or 54%, had a value of
$500 or less, that about 2,000,000 shareholdings, or 14.2,O, had a value
of between $501 to $1,000, and that about 3,000,000, or 22%, were
valued at from $1,001 to $5,000, while less than 9% of the total share-
holdings were valued in excess of $5,000. Furthermore, of this last and
smallest group, only 4.5% had a value of from $5,001 to $10,000, and
only 4% of the total number of shareholdings had a value in excess of
62. "In recent years a veritable racket of baseless lawsuits accompanied by many un-
ethical practices, has grown up in this field. Worse yet, many suits that were well based,
have been brought not in the interest of the corporation or of its stockholders, but in order to
obtain money for particular individuals who had no interest in the corporation or its stck'-
holders. Secret settlements-really payoffs for silence-have been the subjects of common
suspicion." Memorandum of Governor Thomas E. Dewey, quoted in Shielcrawt v. Moffett,
Record on Appeal before N. Y. Court okAppeals, fols. 126-7.
63. Crane, N. Y. Times, Sept 10, 1944, § 5, p. 5, col. 3. See also note 36 supra. The
Law Revision Commission has submitted to the New York Legislature proposed legislation
designed wholly to eliminate the "evil of private settlements." See R co!su1;ATM1o; OF
THE LAw REVISION Co mIssIo-N RELATING TO TERMINATION OF STOCIKHOLDER'S DERI vA-
TIVE AcTioNs, submitted in connection with S. I. 123 and A. 1. 179, Jan. 13, 1945. The
comprehensive Law Revision Study, LEGIs. Doc. No. 65C, has not yet been printed.
64. GRAMBY, TNEC REP., SURVEY OF SEILREHOLDINGS IN 1,710 CoRro,\mTo!s vam
SECURITIES LISTED ON A NATIONAL SECURITIEs EXCAm\NGE, Monograph 30 (1941).
65. Id. at 7 (emphasis supplied).
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$10,000.66 The average value of all shareholdings was placed by the
survey at $3,000.17 Thus, 90% of all shareholdings analyzed had a
value of less than $5,000, and 96% had a value of less than $10,000.
These facts, therefore, seem to establish that Section 61-b, in so far as
it requires the plaintiff-stockholder's shares to have a market value of
$50,000 or more before he can maintain a derivative action, will operate
as a practical matter to deprive an estimated 96% of all shareholders in
American corporations of their right to maintain derivative actions in
New York. It may even take this right from as many as 98% of the
shareholders since it seems likely that of the 4% of shareholdings
valued in excess of $10,000, not more than half have a value in excess
of $50,000. It should be evident from these figures that only the small-
est minority of shareholders will be able to meet the requirement of
Section 61-b that the plaintiff's shareholdings have a value of $50,000
or more.
In an analysis of the distribution of shareholdings from the point of
view of their size, the TNEC study shows that about 86% of the total
shareholdings of common stocks and 93% of the total shareholdings of
preferred stocks were distributed in lots of 100 shares or less."6 Since
the number of shares outstanding ranges from several hundred thou-
sand to many millions, it seems clear that the alternative' requirement
of Section 61-b, namely, that the plaintiff-stockholder's shares con-
stitute 5% of the outstanding stock, is one which the overwhelming
majority of individual shareholders will be unable to meet.
. Thus, Section 61-b sets up conditions that will affect the rights of
most shareholders to maintain derivative actions. Furthermore, the
generally wide distribution of shareholdings, the inertia of stockhold-
ers, and the expense involved in securing concerted action by an
appreciable number of them make apparent the difficulties that would
be encountered in securing joint action by a sufficient percentage of
shareholders to make Section 61-b inapplicable. It would seem there-
fore that Governor Dewey's statement in signing the bill, that a com-
plaining stockholder should find it "easy enough to interest others,
who do hold at least 5%, or stock valued at $50,000," 65 is basically
66. Id. at 20.
67. Id. at 13. GRANBY, op. cit. supra note 64, at 16, draws the following conclusions
from the detailed statistical analysis presented: "The composite impression is thus distinctly
one of concentration of the majority of stock among a small minority of holdings. . ....
The letter of transmittal by Sumner T. Pike, SEC Commissioner, accompanying the mono-
graph, states: "The largest 10 per cent of shareholdings accounted for over 75 per cent of
the value of all common shares and for about 70 per cent of that of all preferred shares,"
Id. at vi.
68. Id. at 15, 16. See also additional statistical analysis with respect to the size of
shareholdings, id. at 32.
69. Governor's Memorandum, N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW AN . (McKinney, Supp. 1944)
31. Contrast this statement with the following realistic judicial appraisal, even though the
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unsound. These practical obstacles are emphasized by a recent deci-
sion holding that the intervention by additional stockholders so as to
make the aggregate value of the complaining shares $50,000 or more
does not constitute compliance with the requirements of Section 61-b
so that a stockholder must secure the joinder of other shareholders
"before the action is brought, and not thereafter." 70
Upon consideration of the actual operation of the statute, it is found
that, when required, the security must be sufficient to enable a court to
meet any award that may be made to the defendants in reimbursement
for their reasonable expenses including attorneys' fees. "It is not
unusual nor would it be unreasonable for defendants in such actions to
retain distinguished counsel. Stockholders' actions are ordinarily di-
rected against several defendants, each of them entitled to counsel of
his own choice. The anticipated aggregate charges of several prominent
law firms for services in a protracted and intricate litigation are bound
to be formidable." 71 Indeed, the amounts of security which the lower
New York courts sustaining Section 61-b 72 have required the stock-
holder to post have ranged from $5,000 to $50,000, and these amounts
under the express terms of the statute may at any time be further
increased by the court if it should deem them insufficient to provide a
fund for the payment of such of the defendants' ex-penses as might be
assessed pursuant to the provisions of Section 61-a. In other vords,
before a stockholder can secure a hearing on his claims, he may be con-
fronted with the necessity of putting up many thousands of dollars,
all or part of which he may forfeit in the event that the defendants are
even partially successful, although their victory may be predicated
upon, for example, the statute of limitations rather than upon the
merits of the action. Furthermore, Section 61-b imposes not merely a
requirement for security, but also, although its misleading title does
not reveal it,73 authorizes the court to resort to this security for the
payment of the defendants' and corporation's expenses including rea-
sonable attorneys' fees. Nor is this indirect manner of imrosinz liability
facts presented in this article from GnAwNY, oc. cit. supra note 64, were not specifically
called to the court's attention: "It is common knowledge that the bulk of the stee: of mozt
of the large corporations is held or controlled or influenced by a few powerful financial in-
stitutions, and often by the very officers and directors whose managerial conduct forms the
basis of stockholders' suits. To corral 5% of the widely scattered stockholders, or stor:-
holders owning $50,000 of stock is not so easy. In many instances public ownership of stock
is so narrowed that the task of garnering 5% of stockholdings would be nigh imp=ible."
Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 49 N.Y. S. (2d) 64,73 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
70. Shientag, J., in Noel Associates, Inc. v. Merrill, 53 N.Y. S. (2d) 143, 153 (Sup. Ct.
1944). For a contrary ruling permitting intervention after suit instituted see Shielcrawt v.
Moffett, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
71. Koch, J., in Citron v. Mangel Stores Corp., SO N. Y. S. (2d) 416, 419 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
72. See note 23 supra.
73. Seesupra, p. 3 53.
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upon the complaining stockholders one which is applicable only if the
court finds bad faith or lack of reasonable basis for the prosecution of
the claim. Although the courts may by interpretation place such a
restriction upon the conditions under which resort to the security may
be made, the statute contains no such express limitation.
More adequate comprehension of the oppressive character of Section
61-b may be obtained by demonstration of the burdens imposed by the
statute in relation to the individual interest which stockholders have in
derivative actions. Attention has already been called to the fact that
the most important publicly held corporations generally have thou-
sands of shares outstanding in the hands of the public, distributed so
widely that the average shareholdings are small in both size and value,
and that therefore the personal interest of any shareholder in a re-
covery is likely to be small. Obviously, therefore, the burdens which
Section 61-b places upon the average shareholder will make it totally
impractical for the average shareholder to maintain a derivative suit.
The leading decision sustaining the constitutionality of Section 61-b,7 4
as well as the well reasoned dissenting opinion, are in accord that
Section 61-b as a practical matter means the elimination of the right
of small stockholders to maintain derivative suits. Although sustaining
the act's constitutionality for reasons to be considered later, Judge
Collins realistically declared in the Shielcrawt case:
"The defendant plausibly retorts that the statute does not im-
pose a lethal sentence on stockholders' actions. All the plaintiffs
have to do, defendant says, is to comply with the statute, where-
upon they proceed. True. But there are many devious stratagems
for denying a litigant his day in court. One circuitous but no less
effective way to destroy a right is to make its enforcement burden-
some. It would be denying the obvious to deny that the dire effect
of the statute-if not the deliberate purpose of it-is to bar many
stockholders' actions by making them excessively costly and
difficult." 75
Similarly, in declaring Section 61-b unconstitutional in Citron v. Mangel
Stores Corporation,"6 Judge Koch emphasized that "the remedy remain-
ing if application is made under the statute and granted is or could be
practically prohibitive and, therefore, no remedy." 77
74. Shielcrawtv. Moffett, 49 N.Y. S. (2d) 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
75. Id. at 73. Similarly, the opinion of the dissenting justices in the Appellate Division,
although predicated upon the view that the statute could not be retroactively applied to the
situation in the Shielcrawt case, contains further substantiation of the views expressed by
Mr. Justice Collins as to the effect of the statute. Thus, the dissent of Judge Callahan com-
ments: "Common sense tells us that to require the posting of $25,000 as security for such
expenses is, in effect, to deprive the owner of a small number of shares of his day in court."
Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 188, 189 (App. Div., 1st Dep't, 1944).
76. 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 416 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
77. Id.at419.
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The full and complete significance of the effect and operation of
Section 61-b upon the rights of a large majority of American investors
may be seen, however, only by viewing its effects in relation to the fact
that "the stockholder's suit is, at present, the only practical way of
permitting the small stockholders to question controlling stockholders
and directors." 71 In the case of large publicly held corporations with
their widely dispersed ownership, it has long been recognized that "the
privilege of voting is purely theoretical" 0 as far as affording a means
whereby the stockholders can secure the accountability of the manage-
ment or dominating stockholders to the stockholders as a body. Berle
and Means in their pioneer study of the modem corporation have
succinctly summarized the position of the mass of stockholders:
"As his personal vote will count for little or nothing . . . , the
stockholder is practically reduced to the alternative of not voting
at all or else of handing over his vote to individuals over whom he has
no control and in whose selection he did not participate. In neither
case will he be able to exercise any measure of control. Rather,
control will tend to be in the hands of those who select the proxy
committee by whom, in turn, the election of directors for the en-
suing period may be made. Since the proxy committee is ap-
pointed by the existing management, the latter can virtually dic-
tate their own successors. Where ownership is sufficiently sub-
divided, the management can thus become a self-perpetuating
body even though its share in the ownership is negligible." ED
The factual considerations here discussed should demonstrate the
necessary "public and private" function which the derivative suit fulfils
as a means of affording the average stockholder at least a slight meas-
ure of control over the acts of corporate managements and controlling
78. Former New York Supreme Court Judge Samuel Rosenman, in a lecture delivered
before the New York Practicing Lawyers Institute, Jan. 28, 1942, quoted by Judge Collins
in Shielcrawtv. MIoffett, 49 N.Y. S. (2d) 64, 71 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
79. DEWING, THE FiNANcIAL PoLIcY OF CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1926) 628.
80. BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORrORATION AND PatErc PROPERTY (1932)
86-8 (emphasis supplied). Similar views have been repeatedly expressed even in con erva-
tive financial circles. See, e.g., a recent article by Ralph Hendershot, Financial Editor of the
New York World Telegram:
"Another basic weakness in the manner in which the free enterprise system has been
interpreted by business leaders is the infringement on the rights of owners of our big indus-
trial enterprises. . . . As most people realize, corporations are owned by common or capital
stockholders. And, as most people also know, these stockholders have little or no voice in
management, even though technically they have the right to vote. This is both undemocratic
and unsound. To all intents and purposes, it places many corporate managements in the
position of imposters. . . . The argument may be advanced that stockholders are interested
only in dividends and, for the most part, are either too dumb or too uninterested to bother
replying to requests for their views. Many people also have felt, and some still feel, that the
general public should not be given the right to vote on political questions for the same rea-
son. This is a democracy; remember?" N. Y. World Telegram, Dec. 7, 1944, p. 24, col. 2.
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stockholders; its value as a potential sanction insures in some measure
at least their personal honesty, their reasonable attention to the affairs
of the corporation, and the fairness of their conduct with respect to all
stockholders. That ,the remedy is cumbersome, inefficient, costly, and
utterly inadequate to perform its functions,81 as well as one that has
been abused by "strike-suitors," are facts that may not be questioned.
Yet, until other methods of control and protection are substituted, 2
drastic curtailment of the remedy's availability in the manner pro-
vided by Section 61-b means the complete disappearance of any equi-
table judicial check on fiduciaries to whom the public at large has
entrusted tens of billions of dollars in assets.8 3 The inherent vice in
Section 61-b is that it destroys the only means available to the over-
whelming majority of stockholders in corporations with publicly dis-
tributed stock without giving them an alternative means of redress or
control and leaving them as a practical matter without access to any
judicial remedy for protection of their rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SECTION 61-B
The statute has been challenged as violative of both the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Federal 4 and New York State"5
Constitutions. The lower New York courts' decisions are divided upon
the fundamental question of whether Section 61-b violates either or
81. "Whether from this larger point of view the stockholder's derivative suit is still
socially an uneconomical device for policing corporate management, it is difficult to estimate.
That it is slow, cumbersome and expensive to all concerned, if the calculation is limited to
the actual cases which reach the courts, cannot be doubted." Rifkind, J., in Brendle v.
Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522,526 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
The difficulties confronting a stockholder seeking to maintain a derivative action are
manifold; as one trial counsel in this field has remarked, there cannot be "the slightest hesita-
tion in declaring that by far the most difficult and burdensome path in the field of corporate
law is that which must be followed by the stockholder who seeks to invoke the only civil
remedy available, the derivative suit." Podell, A Non-Bureaucratic Alternative to Minority
Stockholders' Suits: A Third Viewpoint (1943) 43 COL. L. Rv. 1045, 1047.
82. The most recent article on proposed substitutes for the present stockholder's suit in
Hornstein, A New Forum for Stockholders (1945) 45 COL. L. R.v. 35. See also Algase, A
Minority Stockholder's Suit-A Recommendation, to appear in a forthcoming issue of the
National Lawyers Guild Quarterly. The literature on the subject has been fairly extensive,
one of the earliest and best articles being Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct (1934) 47
HARv. L. Rv. 1305.
83. It is for these reasons that former New York Supreme Court Judge Rosenman rec-
ommended that the stockholders derivative suit "should be favorably evaluated by the
courts: (a) as a protection to stockholders and investors; (b) as a deterrent to negligent or
unscrupulous directors; (c) as a promotion of confidence for future investment in corporate
securities; (d) as a means to make directots direct." Rosenman, supra note 78, at p. 1 of
mimeographed outline of remarks.
84. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
85. N.Y. CONsT. Art. I, § 6.
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both of these constitutional guaranties. One case, Shielcrawl v. Moffell,"
has sustained the statute's constitutionality. The same result was also
reached in Wolf v. A tkinson17 and M1ann v. Luke,6s primarily upon the
authority of the Shielcrawt decision. A contrary ruling declaring the
statute unconstitutional under both the due process and equal protec-
tion provisions has been rendered in the case of Citron v. Mangel Stores
Corporation."9
Before a detailed analysis can be made of the constitutional ques-
tions considered in these various cases and the judicial techniques em-
ployed in their resolution, it is essential first to differentiate between
the due process and equal protection objections to Section 61-b. The
necessity for making this distinction has been well stated by former
Chief Justice Taft:
"It is customary to consider them together. It may be that they
overlap, that a violation of one may involve at times the violation
of the other, but the spheres of the protection they offer are not co-
terminous." 90
An analysis of whether the statute violates the due process guaranty
must be concerned with the manner in which the act in question oper-
ates and its effect in relation to the scope of legislative power; con-
sideration must also be given the various subject matters over which a
legislative body has power and the extent of its authority with respect
to each of these subjects. On the other hand, resolution of the equal
protection question necessarily involves the validity of the classifica-
tion and differentiation embodied in the statute.
The Due Process Clause Objection. It has been a fundamental Ameri-
can tradition "that every man has an inalienable right to go to law." 01
It was in keeping with this fundamental principle that the Supreme
Court of the United States, when giving basic substantive content to
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, declared that one
of the positive rights assured by that constitutional guaranty was
"access to the courts of the country for the protection of . . .persons
and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs ... ." 02 The
Court has been rigorous in its insistence that there be no direct or in-
direct denial of the right of access to legal processes for the protection
86. 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
87. 182 Misc. 675,49 N. Y. S. (2d) 703 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
88. N.Y. L. J., Nov. 10, 1944, p. 1244, col. 4.
89. 50 N. Y. S..(2d) 416 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aft'd mer., 268 App. Div. 905, 51 N. Y. S.
(2d) 754 (1st Dep't 1944).
90. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312,332 (1921) (emphasis supplied).
91. Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 699, 703. This Note contains material from a com-
parative law point of view upon the question of the imposition of attorneys' fees upon
litigants.
92. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,31 (1885).
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of rights and the adjudication of disputes with respect to them. Neither
the presumption of the constitutionality of legislation nor judicial
reluctance to interfere with legislative judgment on the reasonableness
of enactments has deterred the Supreme Court from declaring uncon-
stitutional legislation which it has deemed violative of these basic
tenets of the due process clause.13 An opinion by the late Mr. Justice
Brandeis in a case in which judicial interpretation of a statute was
deemed to have deprived a party of all legal remedy for the protection
of his property illustrates the basic constitutional principles which are
germane:
"While it is for the state courts to determine the adjective as
well as the substantive law of the State, they must, in so doing, ac-
cord the parties due process of law. Whether acting through its
judiciary or through its legislature, a State may not deprive a per-
son of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right, which
the State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded
to him some real opportunity to protect it." 94
When these premises are applied to the facts which the courts have
already found with respect to the effect of Section 61-b-that it will
deprive a great majority of stockholders of the only available judicial
remedy for the protection of their rights,-the unconstitutionality of
the statute under the due process clause would appear patent. It may
not seriously be contended that the New York legislature has the
power completely to destroy the right of a majority of all stockholders
to question the honesty or fairness of the conduct of a corporate man-
agement in handling the assets entrusted to them, unless an adequate
alternative remedy is provided to perform the protective and remedial
93. See cases cited in fra notes 94, 109, 114, 121.
94. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 682 (1930). "We do
not think it is competent for the legislature to deny, for any cause, to a party who has been
illegally deprived of his property, access to the constitutional courts of the State for relief."
Gilman v. Tucker, 128 N. Y. 190, 202, 28 N. E. 1040 (1891). See also Gibbs v. Zimmerman,
290 U. S. 326, 332 (1933); New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 201 (1917). Nor
do cases like Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268,5 N. E. (2d) 815 (1936) or Hanfgarn v. Mark,
274 N. Y. 22, 8 N. E. (2d) 47 (1937) (sustaining the constitutionality of certain aspects of the
New York statute abolishing actions for breach of promise) constitute authority in favor of
the constitutionality of Section 61-b. Those cases, as the Court of Appeals was very careful
to point out, turned expressly "upon the broad ground that the Legislature, in dealing with
the subject of marriage, has plenary power, as marriage differs from ordinary common law
contracts and is subject to control and regulation by the state." Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274
N. Y. 22, 24, 8 N. E. (2d) 47 (1937). Indeed, Hubbs, J., writing for the court, concluded his
opinion with these remarks: "It is suggested that if the Legislature has authority to abolish
the action for alienation of affections, it may also lawfully abolish actions for libel, slander,
and other actions, and that a decision holding the statute in question valid will be so con-
strued. . . .The decision now made should not be so construed." Id. at 26, 8 N. E. (2d)
at 48.
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functions now performed by the derivative suit. If Section 61-b simply
read, "The stockholder's derivative suit may no longer be brought in
New York" (which is often the only place where such actions can be
properly and effectively maintained 5 ), no one would entertain the
slightest doubt as to its unconstitutionality. In effect such an act
would free fiduciary managements from all legal responsibility or
liability to account for their conduct to the stockholders, and no pre-
sumption of the reasonableness of legislative enactments could serve to
sustain it because its obvious objective and effect are not within legisla-
tive power. Moreover, since the interest which stockholders have in the
assets entrusted to the management of their corporations must cer-
tainly be deemed "property rights" 9- within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the affirmative constitutional guaranty of an adequate judicial
remedy for the protection of such rights would be dearly violated.
Does the fact that Section 61-b is not framed in such crude terms but
instead imposes requirements of security for "costs," including at-
torneys' fees, and authorizes the use of the fund posted for their pay-
ment make the statute constitutional although factually the burden of
these provisions renders prohibitive resort to the derivative suit by a
large majority of stockholders? Granted, of course, that the elimina-
tion of baseless suits is d matter within the legislative power, it has been
demonstrated 97 that the requirements of security, and particularly the
imposition of ultimate liability for the defendants' attorneys' fees, are
not actually related under Section 61-b to whether the action is prose-
cuted in good or bad faith or with reasonable cause. May a legislature
thus accomplish indirectly through a great increase in the burden of
costs upon small stockholders what it might not directly?
An affirmative answer to these questions would be indicated by one
of the New York cases sustaining the constitutionality of Section 61-b.
It is reasoned in IVolf v. Atkinson9 that the legislature has control over
the matter of "costs," that it may impose a requirement of security
therefor, and that, accordingly, the legislature may define "costs" to
include an amount sufficient to cover liability for attorneys' fees and
expenses and require security for the same in stockholders' derivative
actions. But the opinion overlooks completely the effect of imposing
these additional burdens upon stockholders and gives no consideration
whatever to the manner in which they will operate in practice to deny
the great majority of stockholders in American corporations their right
95. See supra, p.353.
96. In speaking of a plaintiff-stockholder's right to maintain a derivative action for mis-
management or dishonest conduct, Judge Koch said, "his cause of action is a property right.
Goldstein v. Groesbeck, [142 F. (2d) 422 (CCA 2d, 19441 )." Citron v. Mange! Storwa Corp.,
50 N. Y. S. (2d) 416,419 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
97. See supra, pp. 361-7.
98. 182 Misc. 675,49 N.Y. S. (2d) 703 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
1945]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
to protect their interests through the maintenance of derivative suits.
No pertinent authority for the court's views on constitutionality is
cited other than the decision in the Shielcrawt case.
The court in the Shielcrawt case was fully aware that Section 61-b
operates to deny to the small stockholder his right of access to the
courts for protection of his interests from a faithless management or an
oppressive majority. Yet, Judge Collins held that Section 61-b did not
violate either the due process or equal protection clause of the Con-
stitution. The heart of his decision is to be found in these lines, which
follow a review of the facts concerning Section 61-b and its effect:
"Presumably, all these considerations, as well as others, were
addressed to the Legislature and to the Governor. Their rejection
of the objections is expressed in the passage and approval of the
bill. The debate concerning the sapience of the law has been re-
solved. Respect for the divisional character of our government
directs that each department remain inviolate and independent-
that there be no encroachment by one on the prerogatives of
another. People ex'rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 241 N. Y. 405, 412,
150N.E.497,499. .. ."
That respect for legislative judgment should result in judicial re-
luctance to declare legislation unconstitutional is commendable, but
for this reluctance to be carried to the limits of the Shielcrawt case is
tantamount to abdication of the power of judicial review. If the courts
are to continue to exercise that function,100 and if that function is to be
justified on the ground that it operates to safeguard against legislative
encroachment those rights and privileges guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, the courts should not hesitate-in view of the incontrovertible
facts concerning the operation and effect of the statute-to declare
Section 61-b unconstitutional.
The judicial technique employed by Judge Collins is to be contrasted
with that embodied in the opinion rendered in Citron v. Mangel Stores
Corporation,"'0 in which the court declared Section 61-b unconstitu-
tional under both the due process and equal protection clauses. Judge
Koch in that case did not review in great detail the facts concerning
Section 61-b, but, having the opinions of the courts in the Shielcrawt and
99. Shielcrawtv. Moffett, 49 N.Y. S. (2d) 64,73 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
100. Among the more notable works on judicial review are 1 BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY
THE JUDICIARY (1932); FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE (1935) C.
XlI, reprinted as an article, Judicial Review as an Instrument of Government, in 1 Ass'N AM.
LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1938); Corwin, Marbury v.
Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review (1914) 12 MICH. L. REv. 538; Hale, Jndicial
Review Versus Doctrinaire Democracy (1924) 10 A. B. A. J. 882: Haines, Judicial Review of
Acts of Congress and the Need for Constitutional Reform (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 816.
101. 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 416 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
[Vol. 54: 352
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 61-B
Wolf cases before him, proceeded to set forth his conception of the
judicial function in dealing with such statutes:
"The Constitution is the bedrock of American democracy. Un-
less vigorously upheld by a judiciary eternally vigilant to preserve
the letter and spirit of that immortal document and blind to the
temporary passing needs of the moment, such rights might easily be
whittled away by the disintegrating erosion of successive appar-
ently harmless invasions. The very fact that conceded evils existed
requiring the reforms sought to 'be accomplished by the statute
here attacked is all the more reason why the courts must be zealous
to inquire whether fundamental rights have been invaded." 102
Judge Koch goes on to consider the nature and effect of the burdens im-
posed by Section 61-b, concluding:
"... The prohibitive demands already made in applications
under this statute in previous cases ($113,000 in Shielcrawt v.
Moffett . . .) indicate clearly one of the inherent evils. To require
security in amounts such as have already been applied for would,
in practical effect, be to deprive a plaintiff of his cause of action.
His cause of action is a property right. Goldstein v. Groesbeck,
2 Cir., 142 F. 2d 422. The remedy remaining if application is made
under the statute and granted is or could be practically prohibitive
and, therefore, no remedy. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123; Brinker-
hoff, Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 ...
"The mere increase in liability for costs is not the vice of the
statute. . . . But the increase in liability for costs and expenses
in an unlimited amount that might well be prohibitive and the
denial of the right to be heard unless security therefor is furnished
in advance is a deprivation of property without due process which
the fundamental law of the land forbids. Chicago & N.W. R. Co.
v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35. .... ,, 103
If constitutional guaranties are to be protected by the judiciary, the
approach and technique employed in the Citron case appear sounder
and more in harmony with repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States than the point of view expressed in Shidecrawt v.
Moffett. On several occasions the question of the constitutionality of
state legislation imposing liability for attorneys' fees has been presented
to the Supreme Court.1 4 The decisions of the Court have been marked
102. Id.at 418.
103. Id.at419-20.
104. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 T. S. 150 (1S97); Fidelity Mutual Life Ass'n
v. Mlettler, 185 U. S. 308 (1902); Farmers & lerchants Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U. S. 301
(1903); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73 (1907); lissouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Cade,
233 U. S. 642 (1914); lissouri Pac. Ry. v. Larabee, 234 U. S. 459 (1914); I szzouri, K. & T.
Ry. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412 (1914); Chicago, Al. & St. P. Ry. v. Polt, 232 U. S. 165 (1914);
St. Louis, I. Al. & S. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354 (1912); Chicago & N. IV. Ry. v. Nye
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by a disregard for labels"0 5 (such as whether the liabilities were denom-
inated "costs," "liquidated damages," or simply "penalties") and have
focused upon the factual character and practical effect of the burdens
imposed. That a liability for attorneys' fees constitutes a burden upon
free access to the courts has long been recognized 0 ' and is undoubtedly
the reason why, apart from statute, such fees are not recoverable in this
country, 107 although the law is otherwise in England. 10
The classic opinion of the Supreme Court upon the subject, and one
which illustrates the basic approach of the Court to the constitutional-
ity of such legislation, is that of Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Chicago &
Northwestern Railway v. Nye Schneider Fowler Company,' the facts of
which are typical of the situations presented to the Court. A statute
relating to freight claims against carriers provided that upon failure of a
carrier to pay claims within ninety days after their presentation, the
plaintiff, *if obliged to resort to the courts, could recover 7% interest, a
reasonable attorney's fee, and an additional fee on appeal. The provi-
sions did not apply, however, if the recovery by the plaintiff was not
in excess of a tender made by the defendant. In the Chicago & North-
Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35 (1922); Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U. S. 566
(1934). See also cases cited infra notes 121, 123-6.
105. "The measure, iot the name, controls." Mr. Justice Cardozo in Life & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. McCray, 291 U. S. 566, 573 (1934), discussed infra, pp. 379-81.
106. Thus, the Circuit Court of Appeals in the leading case of Straus v. Victor Talking
Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1924), refused to allow as an element of damage
in an anti-trust action (in which reasonable attorneys' fees are allowed a successful plaintiff)
attorneys' fees incurred by the successful plaintiff in a previous suit between the parties,
The court voiced a theme recurrent in many judicial opinions: " 'The courts are open and
free to all who have grievances and seek remedies therefor, and there should be no restraint
upon a suitor, through fear of liability resulting from failure in his action, which would keep
him from the courts.' Never was it more necessary than now to preserve unimpaired this
right so vital to the public welfare and so thoroughly a part of our theory of government....
It would be a negation of the principle and right of free access to the courts to hold that the
submission of rights to judicial determination involved a dangerous gamble which might
subject the loser to heavy damage." Id. at 799.
107. See McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of
Damages (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 619: Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 699.
108. For a discussion of the English system see Goodhart, Costs (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
849.
"As a result [of the English practice] only the rich man and the pauper can afford the
luxury of English justice; others are under strong compulsion to settle all but the most
flagrant wrongs out of court. It seems clear that the English system is not in accord with
the American conception that every man has an inalienable right to go to law. Long-standing
apathy toward reforming the ancient statutes allowing nominal sums as costs suggests that
American sentiment does not conform to the English premise that the winning party should
be reimbursed in full for the necessary expense of his suit. In certain instances, of course, the
English system proves desirable, but an occasional fair result hardly warrants its use by
America as a pattern in reforming the present procedure." Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J.
699, 703.
109. 260 U. S.35 (1922).
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western Railway case no tender had been made. The plaintiff was suc-
cessful upon the trial, but the defendant had procured on appeal a
reduction of the damages allowed by the lower court. The state su-
preme court had held that under the statute plaintiff was entitled to a
fee on the appeal because no tender had ever been made by the defend-
ant, and it awarded an attorney's fee of $100 for the appeal and $200
for the trial. Mr. Chief Justice Taft, writing for a unanimous Court,
reviewed the facts of many of the Supreme Court decisions concerning
the constitutionality of state legislation allowing attorneys' fees and
set forth the basic approach and criteria utilized in determining the
constitutionality of such legislation involved.
"In this scrutiny of the particular operation of a statute of this
kind, we have sustained it in its application. to one set of facts by
the state court and held it invalid when applied to another ...
"It is obvious that it is not practical to draw a line of distinction
between these cases based on a difference of particular limitations
in the statute and the different facts in particular cases. The Court
has not intended to establish one, but only to follow the general
rule that when, in their actual operation in the cases before it, such
statutes work an arbitrary, unequal and oppressive result ...
which shocks the sense of fairness the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to satisfy in respect of state legislation, they will not be
sustained." 110
Applying these basic principles, the Court held that in so far as the
statute was construed to allow an attorney's fee of $200 in connection
with the judgment secured in the trial court by the plaintiff, the act
was valid, but that in so far as it was deemed to allow the recovery of an
attorney's fee, even though only $100 in amount, to the plaintiff upon
the appeal although the defendant had secured some reduction in the
damages the act was unconstitutional because the burden so imposed
acted as a deterrent upon the railroad's right of access to the courts.
Recognizing that the legislature in the exercise of its powers could
impose penalties. upon carriers in order to discourage delays by them in
the payment of claims, the opinion of the Court emphasizes:
"This penalty or stimulus may be in the form of attorney's fees.
But it is also apparent from these cases that such penalties or fees
must be moderate and reasonably sufficient to accomplish their
legitimate object and that the imposition of penalties or conditions
that are plainly arbitrary and oppressive and 'violate the rudiments
of fair play' insisted on in the Fourteenth Amendment, will be held
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After reviewing the facts of the case in connection with the allowance of
the attorney's fee upon the appeal, the opinion concludes with this
passage, which appears equally applicable to Section 61-b:
"Penalties imposed on one party for the privilege of appeal to the
courts, deterring him from vindication of his rights, have been held
invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Missouri Pacific R1y.
Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340. While the present case does not involve
any such penalties as were there imposed, we think the principle
applies to the facts of this case." 112
The unconstitutionality of Section 61-b as a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution would seem established by the
Supreme Court's decision in Chicago & Northwestern Railway v. Nye
Schneider Fowler Company and the principles there enunciated. Fur-
therniore, the Court's citation of its decision in Missouri Pacific Rail-
way v. Tucker 113 emphasizes the Court's fundamental concern with
protecting, unimpaired and unhindered, the right of free access to the
courts for the protection of asserted violations of property or personal
rights. The Missouri Pacific Railway case is but one of a long series of
Supreme Court decisions 114 wherein the Court, in order to protect the
constitutional privilege of asking for judicial protection against the
destruction of one's rights, has repeatedly declared unconstitutional
legislation imposing burdens upon access to the courts far less stringent
and onerous than those embodied in Section 61-b. The essence of
these Supreme Court decisions is epitomized by this sentence from the
112. Id. at 47.
113. 230 U. S. 340 (1913).
114. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (190 8) ($5,000 fine for violation of statutory rate);
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340 (1913) ($500 liquidated damages provision im-
posed on common carriers charging rates in excess of those fixed by the statute, Wadley
Southern Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651 (1915) (fine of $1,000 under a statute authorizing
$5,000 penalty for each violation of the statute); Southwestern Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238
U. S. 482 (1915) (action to recover $6,300 in penalties at rate of $100 per day for alleged
violation of statutory prohibition against rate discrimination); Oklahoma Operating Co. v,
Love, 252 U. S. 331 (1920) (penalty of $500 a day for violation of a statutory rate); see also
Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 183 U. S. 79, 100 (1901); F. C. Henderson, Inc. v.
Railroad Comm. of Texas, 56 F. (2d) 218, 223 (W. D. Tex. 1932).
For discussion of some aspects of these cases, see Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1216, re-
printed in 2 Ass'N Am. LAW ScHooLs, op. cit. supra note 100, at 1526.
An analogous line of cases is that represented by Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257
U. S. 529 (1922), in which the Court held unconstitutional a state statute withdrawing the
licenses of foreign corporations to do business in the state if they resorted to the federal courts
located in the state. The basis of the Court's decision was stated by Chief Justice Taft: "The
principle . .. rests on the ground that the Federal Constitution confers upon the citizens of
one state the right to resort to federal courts in another, that state action whether legislative
or executive, necessarily calculated fo curtail the free exercise of the right thus secured is
void, because the sovereign power of a State .. . is subject to the limitations of the su-
preme fundamental law." Id. at 532-3.
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opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Oklahoma Operating Company v.
Love: "Obviously a judicial review beset by such deterrents does not
satisfy the constitutional requirements. . ." 5 Similarly, in a lead-
ing case on this question,"' Mr. Justice Lamar, writing for a unanimous
Court, used language which appears particularly appropriate to Sec-
tion 61-b:
"But in whatever method enforced, the right to a judicial review
must be substantial, adequate and safely available--but that right
is merely nominal and illusory if the party to be affected can appeal
to the courts only at the risk of having to pay penalties so great that
it is better to yield to orders of uncertain illegality rather than to
ask for the protection of the law." 117
It is these considerations, as Mr. Chief Justice Taft expressly pointed
out in the Chicago & Aorthwestern Railway case, which have guided the
courts in their resolution of the constitutional validity of legislation
imposing liability for a reasonable attorney's fee. Such statutes have
been sustained only where the burden was deemed one which would not
"through fear of liability resulting in his action . ..keep [the suitor]
from the courts." 111 Even in sustaining the validity of particular
applications of such statutes, however, the courts have taken pains to
point out, as did the late Mr. Justice Cardozo in the much cited case of
Life & Casualty Insurance Company v. UcCray,"° that "it is all 'a
question of more or less.' . . . The price of error may be so heavy as to
erect an unfair barrier against the endeavor of an honest litigant to
obtain the judgment of a court. In that event the Constitution in-
tervenes and keeps the courtroom open." ' 1 Indeed, as exemplified by
the Chicago & Northwestern Railway case, the Supreme Court has not
hesitated to declare unconstitutional such statutes when they were
construed to impose burdens which would deter a person from securing
judicial protection or vindication of his rights. 121
It should be evident, therefore, that one may not deduce from the
decisions allowing the imposition of liability for a reasonable attorney's
fee that a legislature may impose an unlimited liability for such fees
115. 252 U. S. 331,337 (1920).
116. Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651 (1915).
117. Id.at661.
118. Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 744, 18 N. IV. 870, 871 (1884). See Strau v.
Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
119. 291 U. S. 566 (1934) (state statute imposing liability for reasonable attorney's fee
and 12% damage penalty in event beneficiary required to resort to litigation sustained when
the attorney's fee involved was $200 and the penalty an additional $62.50).
120. Id. at 574-5.
121. Two additional cases in which the Supreme Court has held legislation unconstitu-
tional for imposing liability for attorney's fees are St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Wynne, 224
U. S. 354 (1912); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Polt, 233 U. S. 334 (1914).
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without violating the due process clause. 122 Furthermore, the circum-
stances under which the courts have sustained the imposition of liabil-
ity for reasonable attorneys' fees indicate the inapplicability of such
cases to the situation presented by Section 61-b. Practically all the
legislation involved in these cases has been concerned with securing
from common carriers,2 3 insurance companies, 124 and employers, 12 5 the
prompt payment of reasonable claims by the companies and the pre-
vention of their resorting to delay, thereby compelling claimants to
engage in litigation to secure payment. Under such factual circum-
stances, the ratioiale supporting judicial sanction of "moderate pen-
alties," whether in the form of damages or liability for reasonable
attorneys' fees or both, has always been that "the seasonable payment
of just claims against them for faulty performance of their function
is a part of their duty, and that reasonable penalties may be imposed
upon them for failure to consider and pay such claims, in order to dis-
courage delays by them." 121
122. A student comment on the Citron case in the Harvard Law Review appears to be
guilty of just such an error of logic: "Nor, apart from the problem of discrimination, is the
imposition of liability for the successful party's attorney's fees, a denial of due process."
(1944) 58 HARv. L. REv. 135, 136. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U. S. 566 (1934),
and Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642 (1914), are cited in support. Such a state-
ment seemingly reflects faulty analysis of the cases cited and a disregard for the Supreme
Court's concern with the factual character of the particular burdens imposed.
123. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73 (1907) ($50 penalty);
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642 (1914) (reasonable attorney's fee not to ex-
ceed $20).
124. Fidelity Mutual Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308 (1902) (attorney's fee of $2,500
on $15,000 recovery plus 12% penalty damages of $5,175, of which plaintiff had remitted
$3,375, leaving only $1,800 as the penalty to be passed on by the Court); Farmers' & Mer-
chants' Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U. S. 301 (1903) (attorney's fee of $150); Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co., 4 F. (2d) 835 (C. C. A. 5th; 1925), cert. denied, 268
U. S. 704 (1925) (in action on insurance policy in which there was recovery by plaintiff of
$21,000, award of $2,100 attorney's fee sustained).
125. Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 179 N. E. 684 (1932) (attorney's fee of $35 allowed
when employee had to bring workmen's compensation proceeding); Russell v. Western 013
Co., 206 N. C. 341, 174 S. E. 101 (1934) (unspecified attorney's fee in workmen's compensa-
tion proceeding); New Mexico State Hy. Dep't. v. Bible, 38 N. M. 372,34 P. (2d) 295 (1934)
(attorney's fee of $250 in workmen's compensation proceeding).
These cases, as well as those cited supra notes 94, 123, 124, are typical of the factual
situations in which statutes imposing liability for attorneys' fees has been involved. For
collections of additional authorities see Notes (1921) 11 A. L. R. 884, (1934) 90 A. L. R. 530.
126. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35, 43-4 (1922).
Moreover, many of the statutes imposing liability for attorney's fees have used that device
to secure compliance with a statutory duty. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Matthews,
174 U. S. 96 (1899) (statute allowed action for damages resulting from fires caused by
operation of railroad, and if recovery under statute, plaintiff allowed reasonable attorney's
fee); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71 (1928) (statute
legalized cooperative market associations and allowed liquidated damages of $500 and a
reasonable attorney's fee in actions against one inducing a cooperative member's breach of
contract with the association); Hindman v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 32 Idaho 133, 179
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Through analysis of the particular cases which have sustained such
penalties it is demonstrable that the burdens thus far allowed to be
imposed upon an insurance company, carrier, or employere can in no
sense be deemed factually to have operated as a deterrent to their
securing a legal determination of their rights. Indeed, as already
pointed out, when the statutes as construed have been found to have
any such effect, the courts have declared them unconstitutional. -
Legislation of this character, therefore, seeks the avoidance of litiga-
tion when the disparity of power and resources between the parties is
such that on of them by resorting to it can render valueless, for prac-
tical purposes, the "just" claims of the other. 2 In contrast, Section
61-b imposes its burdens not upon those whose power and resources
enable them to engage in endlessly protracted litigation, but solely
upon the stockholder asserting a claim of mismanagement, dishonesty,
or inequitable treatment against fiduciaries who occupy such a position
of domination or control over the corporation to whom the claim be-
longs that it declines to sue. 29 To find an analogy to Section 61-b
Pac. 837 (1918) (statute required railroads to maintain fences along their right of way and
provided for damage action where railroad failed to maintain such fences); Cleveland,
C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hamilton, 200 I1. 633, 66 N. E. 3S9 (1903) (statute required railroads
to keep right of way free of combustible material and in actions for damages resulting from
breach, reasonable attorney's fee allowed); United States Elect. Power & Light Co. v. State,
79 Md. 63,28 Ad. 768 (1894) (in action to recover taxes where not paid promptly, reasonable
attorney's fee allowed).
A recent case failing into this category is Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist. v. Pacific
Gas & Elect. Co., 20 Cal. (2d) 684, 128 P. (2d) 529 (1942), cert. denicd, 318 U. S. 759 (1943),
upholding a California statute which provided that if the residents of a locality authorized
the acquisition by a municipality of its own utilities and a private utility company instituted
unsuccessful action to enjoin such acquisition, the municipality could recover reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred in such proceeding:
". .. the Legislature in order to protect the public agency in engaging in a pursuit
which it had deemed necessary to the public welfare, might reasonably have required, as it
did, that a private utility with such a probable motive [i.e., to engage in litigation as a means
of delay and harassment], should reimburse the public treasuries for expenses incurred in
unjustifiable litigation prosecuted by the utility." Id. at 694, 128 P. (2d) at 535. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was quite emphatic in its characterization of the provisions for the
recovery of attorneys' fees as creating "substantive rights," and it therefore allowed the
recovery of such fees, although the litigation in question had been brought by the utility
in the federal court located in California.
127. See cases cited supranotes 114-7, 121.
128. "Dependents left without a breadwinner will be exposed to Lore distress if life
insurance payments are extracted slowly and painfully, after costly contests in the courts.
Health and accident insurance will often be the sources from which the sick and the dizabled
are to meet their weekly bills. Fire insurance moneys, if withheld, may leave the business
man or the householder without an office or a home." Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291
U.S. 566, 569 (1934).
129. "Courts of equity will, at the suit of a stockholder, interpose their powers to remedy
or prevent a wrong to a corporation by its officers or directors when the corporation, because
it is controlled by the wrongdoers or for other reason, fails and refuses to take appropriate
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among the statutes imposing liability for reasonable attorneys' fees
that have been sustained by the courts one would have to find an act
(a) that imposed upon a claimant virtually unlimited liability for the
common carrier's or insurance company's attorneys' fees, (b) that
governed a claimant who, like the stockholder, does not secire, any
personal recovery but acts merely in a representative capacity, and
(c) that imposed upon defendants no obligation equivalent to that
imposed upon the claimant. Furthermore, the tzpe of statute so far
sustained has been one which serves the socially desirable objective of
securing the fulfillment of duties by the person upon whomi the burden
is imposed.; Section 61-b will obviously have exactly the opposite effect
since its burdens are placed not upon the fiduciary with duties to
stockholders but upon the latter in the event that they should resort
to the only available judicial remedy for the non-performance of those
duties. Moreover, a factual analysis of the burdens imposed by Sec-
tion 61-b shows that it violates those elementary premises of due
process which the courts have required even though they may sustain
in a particular case the liability or penalty involved. Judged from the
standpoint of " 'the rudiments of fair play' insisted on in the Four-
teenth Amendment," 130 the provisions of Section 61-b would appear
clearly to violate that constitutional guaranty.
The Equal Protection Clause Objection. Section 61-b imposes its
requirements of security and the right to resort thereto for defendants'
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, only upon shareholders
owning less than either $50,000 worth of stock or 5% of the outstand-
ing shares; it has no application to those owning more than either of
these alternative amounts of stock, and it imposes no burdens of any
character upon the defendants in the event that they are unsuccessful
in whole or in part. Such a statute raises under the equal protection
clauise the fundamental issue of the validity of its classification and
differentiation between (a) large and small stockholders of the same
corporation and (b) plaintiffs and defendants in stockholders' suits.
It is of course well settled that a legislature has broad discretion in
its power to classify and differentiate, and it is only when the classifica-
tion employed has no reasonable relationship to an end within legisla-
tive power that the statute violates the constitutional guaranty of
action for its own protection." Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N. Y. 257, 264, 179 N. E. 487, 489
(1932).
Moreover, a derivative action will not lie when the corporation itself institutes action,
General Investment Corp. v. Addinsell, 255 App. Div. 319, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 377 (lot Dep't
1938), and "individual stockholders had the right to institute suit only after demand therefor
had been made to the directors and they refused to proceed, or upon alleging such facts as
would show that a demand would be futile. Guttman v. Conda Co., 249 App. Div. 621, 290
N. Y. S. 874; Continental Securities v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 99 N. E. 138 ... " Noel
Associates, Inc. v. Merrill, 53 N, Y. S. (2d) 143,148 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
130. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35,44 (1922)
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equal protection. Although there has been much disagreement over
whether the facts in a given case afforded a basis for the classification
employed in the particular statute, the courts have been unanimous in
their statement of the basic test to be applied. Former Chief Justice
Hughes said that "the principle that the State has a broad discretion
in classification, in the exercise of its power of regulation, is constantly
recognized by this Court. Still, the statute may show on its face that
the classification is arbitrary .. .or that may appear by facts ad-
mitted or proved." "I' Mr. Justice Brandeis, in one of his classic
dissents, stated the applicable principles in these words:
"In passing upon legislation assailed under the equality clause
we have declared that the classification must rest upon a difference
which is real, as distinguished from one which is seeming, specious,
or fanciful, so that all actually situated similarly will be treated
alike; that the object of the classification must be the accomplish-
ment of a purpose or the promotion of a policy, which is within the
permissible functions of the State; and that the difference must
bear a relation to the object of the legislation which is substantial,
as distinguished from one which is speculative, remote or negligi-
ble." 132
Assuming that the end which Section 61-b is designed to serve is the
elimination of "baseless" derivative suits, an objective clearly within
legislative power, does the differentiation made by it betveen those
holding $50,000 or 5% of the stock and those who hold a lesser amount
bear a reasonable relation to this objective? Further, is this relation-
ship one "which is substantial, as distinguished from one which is
speculative, remote or negligible"?
It is to be noted that the differentiation which the statute makes
between the right of stockholders to bring derivative suits based upon
the amount of shares owned violates the basic principles of the stock-
holder's derivative suit. It has been a cardinal rule that the action
may be brought by any shareholder without regard to the amount of
his holdings I because he is acting not to obtain a personal recovery,
but on behalf of all of the stockholders.
131. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209-10, quoted in Aerated
Products Co. v. Godfrey, 290 N. Y. 92,99,48 N. E. (2d) 275,279 (1943). See also Merchants
Refrigerating Co. v. Taylor, 275 N.Y. 113,120-3,9 N. E. (2d) 799,801-3 (1937).
132. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389,403,406 (1923). Substantially
the same language was used in the opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland for the majority of the
Court in finding the statute in question violative of the equal protection clausie. See alo
Frost v. Corporation Comm., 278 U. S. 515, 522-3 (1929); Louisville Gas & Elect. Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U. S. 32,37 (1928).
133. See, e.g., Everett v. Phillips, 288 N. Y. 227, 233, 43 N. E. (2d) 13, 20 (1942), in
which the Court of Appeals declared that "the plaintiff here is asserting a cause of action for
wrong done to the corporation of which he is a minority stockholder. In such an action it is
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The only possible argument that may be used to sustain the statutory
classificatiorl is that those holding $50,000 or 5% of stock will have a
greater personal interest in a recovery obtained in such actions, that
this will serve as an indication of the good faith underlying institution
of the action, and that since the personal interest in a recovery of the
stockholder owning a lesser amount of shares is smaller there is an in-
dication that the action is without reasonable basis or brought in bad
faith. There is, however, no evidentiary support for an assumption
that derivative suits brought by those holding $50,000 worth of stock
or 5% thereof are more meritorious or brought in better faith than
those brought by stockholders owning lesser amounts of shares or that
more suits of this character are brought in bad faith by small stock-
holders than by larger stockholders. Moreover, this argument for the
classification is realistically untenable, certainly in so far as the most
important American corporations are concerned. In the previous dis-
cussion of the factual background of this statute 134 it was pointed out
that many of the corporations in this country have thousands of shares
outstanding, and that therefore the personal interest in a recovery of
any shareholder, or group of shareholders, is necessarily quite small
although the total amount obtained for all shareholders may reach
millions of dollars.
Concretely, with respect to these corporations, since the amount of
personal interest in the recovery by shareholders having more than
$50,000 worth of stock will be relatively as slight as those possessing a
lesser amount of stock, the differentiation between them is without any
rational basis. For example, in the case of Winkelman v. General Molors
Company, 135 there was a recovery of some $4,000,000, and the Report of
the New York Chamber of Commerce in citing the case emphasizes
that the personal interest of the plaintiff-stockholders was only a few
dollars, apparently suggesting that in spite of the large absolute amount
of the recovery the action was without reasonable basis or not brought
in good faith. 138 Yet, if the action had been maintained by a stock-
holder having $50,000 worth of stock, his personal interest in the re-
covery would have been relatively no greater than the actual plaintiff's,
and the amount of his personal interest would have afforded no greater
assurance of reasonable grounds for the action or of good faith in its
prosecution. There are approximately 44,000,000 shares of General
Motors Company outstanding, and, assuming a market value of $50
per share, a stockholder who had 1,000 shares would be exempt under
Section 61-b. His personal interest in a recovery of $4,000,000 would
immaterial whether the minority stockholder who asserts it has a large or a small inter-
est. . .
134. See supra, pp. 359-72.
135. 44 F. Supp. 960 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
136. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 49.
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be 1,000 times llc. (the value per share of the recovery) or approxi-
mately $110. This analysis might be repeated with respect to any
number of the corporations in which so many Americans have an
investment. Thus, in so far as publicly held corporations are concerned,
the differentiation between stockholders owning more or less than
$50,000 worth of stock seemingly lacks a reasonable relationship to
any permissible objective.
Two hypothetical examples may demonstrate further this absence of
reasonable relation to a permissible objective, such as the elimination of
groundless suits. Assume, first, that a stockholder owns 4,o of the
stock of a corporation, which shares have a market value of $40,000.
He asserts a claim that faithless fiduciaries have wrongfully depleted
the assets of the corporation to the extent of $4,000,000. Under the
provisions of Section 61-b he must post security which in amount may
well exceed the total value of his shareholdings. Even though owning
only 4% of the stock, he has a personal interest in the recovery of
approximately $40,000. Inability to raise the large amount required by
Section 61-b means that he will be unable to prosecute his action, re-
gardless of the merit of his claims.
Contrast that case with one in which a stockholder owns 5% of the
stock of a corporation whose assets total $100,000, the market value of
his stock being $5,000. He seeks to assert a claim of wrongdoing in the
amount of $50,000. His personal interest in any recovery would be
only $2,500, yet such a stockholder, unlike the one in the first case pre-
sented, is wholly exempt from any requirement of security or the possi-
bility of having any ultimate liability assessed against that security.
These examples should demonstrate the complete lack of reason-
able relationship between the means employed by the statute--the
differentiation between the stockholders required to post security and
the possibility of its subjection to the assessment of liability-and any
permissible objective. Such lack of reasonable relationship between
means and end has often been a ground upon which the Supreme Court
of the United States has declared a statute unconstitutional."--
It may be argued, as has been pointed out, that the ownership of
$50,000 worth of stock may be regarded, at least primafacie, as some
evidence of good faith and that, therefore, security from those owning
137. See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 (1928) (Pennsylvania statute
which required every drugstore to be operated by a pharmacist and prohibited the ownership
of drugstores by corporations, associations or partnerships, unless all partners or members
were licensed pharmacists); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183 (1928) (city zoning regula-
tion found to have no substantial relation to subject matter within legislative power, namely,
public health, safety, mo-als, or general welfare); Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504
(1924) (Nebraska statute requiring loaves of bread to be not more nor less than a specific
weight); Smith v. Tex'as, 233 U. S. 630 (1914) (Te.xas statute prohibiting any person from
being a railroad train conductor unless for two years immediately preceding his employ-
ment as such he had been employed as a brakeman or conductor on a freight train).
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less than this amount may reasonably be required merely as a means of
insuring the good faith of those prosecuting the action. Section 61-b
goes much further, however, and provides that the court may resort to
this security to pay any allowance for the defendants' expenses, includ-
ing reasonable attorneys' fees. This imposition of liability for the de-
fendants' expenses is not limited to situations in which, after trial, the
action is found to have been brought in bad faith or without reasonable
grounds. No liability is imposed by the statute upon stockholders who
are found to have brought an action without reasonable grounds or even
in bad faith, provided only that they own more than a certain amount
of stock. Instead, such liability is imposed upon small stockholders
regardless of the reasonable ground for their conduct in bringing the
action if they are so unfortunate as to lose the suit in whole or in part.
When a court has before it all the plaintiff's grounds for bringing suit,
from which a determination may be made whether the suit is baseless,
and a distinction is made between plaintiffs solely upon the amount of
stock owned by them, such discrimination between rich and poor
would seem an odious one clearly repugnant to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
Although Judge Collins in the Shielcrawt case failed to analyze clearly
the operation of the classification of Section 61-b, merely citing nu-
merous cases to the effect that the legislature has broad powers of
differentiation, Judge Koch in the Citron case went directly to the
heart of the equal protection objection:
"The classification set up in the statute is not predicated upon a
showing of any lack of merit or probable lack of merit in the action,
or the existence or probable existence of any of the other attendant
evils sought to be corrected, but upon an arbitrary classification of
the ownership, of a certain proportion or value of stock. The real
vice insofar as a determination of the validity of the statute under
the equal protection clause is concerned is the imposition of liability
for the additional expenses only upon a certain class without any
reasonable relation between the object of the legislation to prevent
the institution and maintenance of baseless litigation and attendant
evils and the class upon which the new liability is imposed with the
requirement of security in advance." 138
138. Citron v. Mangel Stores Corp., 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 416, 420 (Sup. Ct. 1944). Almost
half a century ago, Mr. Justice Brewer in a United States Supreme Court decision involving
the equal protection clause wrote: "The State may not say that all white men shall be sub.
jected to the payment of the attorney's fees of parties successfully suing them and all black
men not. It may not say that all men beyond a certain age shall be alone thus subjected, or
all men possessed of a certain wealth. These are distinctions which ado not furnish any proper
basis for the attempted classification. That must always rest upon some difference which
bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is pro-
posed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis." Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v.
Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 155 (1897).
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One New York court, hovever, has used the following assailable
chain of reasoning in finding that Section 61-b does not violate the
equal protection clause: the legislature may require security for costs
for non-residents as distinguished from residents; therefore it may
distinguish between those owning more than $50,000 worth of stock
and those owning a lesser amount, not only for the purpose of imposing
a security requirement but also in assessing liability for defendants'
expenses, including attorneys' fees.139 Such an argument appears to
overlook the fact that while a distinction between residents and non-
residents may be justified as to the requirement of security for costs, 14
it affords no basis for authorizing the imposition of liability for de-
fendants' expenses. Similarly, the initial premises of the court's argu-
ment offer no basis for the conclusion that not only security but the
imposition of liability may be predicated upon the amount of stock
that a plaintiff owns, which is, in effect, the criterion employed.
Section 61-b contains an even more pervasive inequality than the
imposition of liabilities on and the requirement of security from small
stockholders only. Following the pattern of Section 61-a, it allows as-
sessment of ultimate liability foi the defendants' expenses against the
security posted by the plaintiff, but it imposes upon the defendants in
the event that they are unsuccessful no liability of any character for
the plaintiff's or corporation's similar expenses. Consequently it has no
security requirements with respect to the defendants. The statute
139. Volf v. Atkinson, 182 Misc. 675,49 N. Y. S. (2d) 703 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
140. Cardozo, writing as Chief Justice for a unanimous New York Court of Appeals
in the leading case of Smith v. Loughman, 245 N. Y. 486, 157 N. E. 753 (1927), cert. denied,
275 U. S. 560 (1927), held a New York statute which imposed a greater tax liability upon
non-residents as distinguished from residents violative of the equal protection.clause, point-
ing out that even with respect to such an obvious basis of differentiation statutes may be
unconstitutional unless there is a reasonable ground for classification apart from the mere
fact that there are two separate categories. The essence of his opinion is equally apposite to
Section 61-b:
"At times, the character of the act may be so affected by the residence of the
actor as to call for varying regulation with a view to the attainment in the end of a
truer level of equality. Thus, non-residents resorting to our courts may be com-
pelled to give security for costs. . . . In these and like cases, the effect of the
apparent discrimination is not to cast upon the non-resident a burden heavier in its
ultimate operation than the one falling upon residents, but to restore the equilib-
rium by withdrawing an unfair advantage. . . . In these and like cases, the
difference in treatment, whatever it may have been, was made necessary by condi-
tions inseparably interwoven with difference of residence, and was proportioned to
the necessity. Only for this was it upheld.
"The statute now before us does not use its discriminations to establish meas-
ure and proportion, its discords as a means to harmony. . .. What is here is an
inequality that is purported and pervasive." Id. at 493-4, 157 N. E. at 755-6.
See also Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U. S. 544
(1923) (statute imposing greater procedural burdens upon foreign than upon domestic
corporations held violative of the equal protection clause).
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therefore serves to increase an existing great disparity in wealth and
power in these actions between the stockholders on the one hand and
the defendant fiduciaries on the other. "The statute . . . does not use
its discriminations to establish measure and proportion, its discords as a
means to harmony," 141 but, on the contrary, instead of operating to
create a fairer measure of equality between the parties-as do statutes
imposing liability for attorneys' fees upon common carriers and in-
surance companies, for example 142 --operates only to increase the
existing lack of equality. This aspect of Section 61-b's arbitrary classi-
fications would appear to be the very one which Mr. Justice Brewer,
writing on behalf of the United States Supreme Court in the famous
case of Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Company, 143 condemned in
declaring a Kansas statute unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause:
"Suppose a law were passed that if any laboring man should
bring or defend an action and fail in his claim or defence, either in
whole or in part, he should in the one instance forfeit to the de-
fendant half of the amount of his claim, and in the other be pun-
ished by a fine equal to half of the recovery against him, and that
such law by its terms applied only to laboring men, would there be
the slightest hesitation in holding that the laborer was denied the
equal protection of the laws?" 144
CONCLUSION
It seems clear that Section 61-b violates both the due process and
equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. For
this reason the additional issues of statutory construction and con-
stitutional law raised by application of the act to litigations already
pending at the time it became effective have not been treated. To date
all the New York lower courts that have administered the statute, in-
cluding those which have held it unconstitutional, have applied it
retroactively to pending actions. The doubtful validity of such retroac-
tive construction is demonstrated, however, by the forceful dissenting
opinion rendered by two judges of the New York Appellate Division in
the Shielcrawt case.
145
141. Smith v. Loughman, 245 N. Y. 486, 157 N. E. 753 (1927), cited supra note 140.
142. See supro, pp. 381-2.
143. 183 U. S. 79 (1901).
144. 1d. at 100-1.
145. "Forgetting for the moment any attempt at nomenclature in order to classify the
new law as one affecting 'substantive' rights or one affecting merely the remedy and thus
being 'procedural' in nature, it is plain that the law in question imposes new and drastic
restrictions on the rights of stockholders of a certain class to sue on behalf of their corpora-
tion. . . . The new law, if applied here, would have the practical effect of nullifying things
already done by plaintiffs as of right when this action was brought. . . .So applied Sec-
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Section 61-b, it is submitted, places in jeopardy the rights and in-
terests of the vast majority of investors in American public corpora-
tions, as well as those of an incalculable number of shareholders in
closed corporations. It is of the utmost importance that the question
of its constitutionality be authoritatively determined as quickly as
possible. It would be unfortunate if the issue of its application to pend-
ing suits-a matter of no inconsiderable practical importance since a
most conservative estimate would place the number of actions of this
character at not less than one hundred-were permitted to obscure or
delay the immediate consideration by the New York Court of Appeals
of its constitutionality.
Finally, one may express the hope that no other legislature will copy
the unfortunate example that has been set in New York by the enact-
ment of Section 61-b. The precipitous procedure by which its passage
into law was secured should warn the legislators of other states that
the statute does not reflect the mature and considered judgment which
might otherwise be expected from the legislature of one of the most
important financial and commercial states in the Union.
After the foregoing article was written and printed, the Court of
Appeals handed down its decision in the Shielcrawt case. 146 The Court
chose to avoid passing upon any aspect of the constitutionality of
Section 61-b and limited its ruling to the narrow issue of the retroactive
ton 61-b would therefore do more than impose a new measure of costs. It would limit-if,
indeed it did not prevent-recourse to the courts by these plaintiffs . . . for the purpose of
pursuing to completion a recognized remedy already prayed for. . . . In so far as this action
is concerned, it seems sufficient that, as construed, the statute reaches backwards and affects
the rights of the plaintiffs by restricting, to the extent of practically extinguishing, existing
remedies already sought." Callahan and Cohn, JJ., dissenting in the Shielcrawt case, 51
N. Y. S. (2d) 188, 189-90 (App. Div., 1st Dep't, 1944). See also Matter of Berkovitz v.
Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288 (1921). See also the clear and vigorous
opinion of Judge Shientag holding the companion statute amending Section 61--discussed
supra note 7-not to be retroactive in its application. Noel Associates, Inc. v. Merrill,
N. Y. L. J., Dec., 1944, pp. 1510, 1511, col. 2. Carson, Further Plases of Derivative Actions
Against Directors (1944) 29 CORN. L. Q. 431, 459, urges that this companion statute and
Section 61-b be held applicable to suits brought in the federal courts located in New York
[compare discussion supra, pp. 355-6], and at the same time urges that the statute be deemed
"procedural" for the purpose of having it applied retroactively. See id. at 457.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the question of retroactivity of a statute
is not to be decided upon the basis of whether it is one denominated "substantive" or "proce-
dural." See, e.g., United States v. St. Louis Ry., 270 U. S. 1 (1926); Ettor v. Tacoma, 228
U. S. 148 (1913). For an excellent discussion of the constitutional questions posed by the
retroactive application of statutes see Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem
in Constitutional Law (1939) 38 MIcH. L. REv. 30. For a valuable collection of material on
the history of the rule against the retroactive application of statutes see Smead, The Rule
against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence (1936) 20 MINN. L.
REv. 775.
146. 6 Law Rep. News 30, Apr. 12, 1945, p. 2, col. 2.
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application of the Act to suits pending at the time of its enactment.
The Court recognized that the statute differed from "purely procedural
statutes, both in purpose and effect," but following the pattern of
reasoning and authorities embodied in the Appellate Division dissent-
ing opinion, 47 it ruled that the statute could not be construed to be
applicable to pending actions. It is regrettable, indeed, for the reasons
outlined above, that the Court should have disregarded the interests
in corporate management of the American investor by failing to pass
upon the constitutionality of Section 61-b.
147. See note 145 supra.
